## T

### 2ac – t-economic engagement

#### North American Defense Industrial Base increases economic engagement – we meet

US COTA 91 – Congress Office of Technology Assessment (“Redesigning Defense: Planning the Transition to the Future U.S. Defense Industrial Base”, OTA-ISC-500, July 1991, http://ota-cdn.fas.org/reports/9134.pdf)//javi

The report is organized into five chapters and two appendices. This chapter summarizes key findings and policy issues. Chapter 2 outlines potential threats to the United States and its allies, the future U.S. force structure that may be developed to counter these threats, and the implications of alternative force structures for the DTIB. Chapter 3 surveys the structure and current condition of the DTIB, and chapter 4 examines trends and problems in the base, including strategies of defense companies for responding to continuing budget cuts. Chapter 5 outlines some desirable characteristics of the future DTIB and discusses alternative national strategies for moving to a base that is capable of meeting the Nation’s long-term security needs. Appendix A describes the integrated U.S. and Canadian defense industrial complex, known as the North American Defense Industrial Base, and explores some of the implications for the DTIB of increased economic integration with Mexico. Appendix B contains a brief discussion of defense industrial databases and industrial base analytical models.

#### Aff increases investment in Mexican manufacturing companies in order to increase economic integration – we meet

**Counter Interpretation – Economic engagement is access to technology**

Haass, 2K – Brookings Foreign Policy Studies director

[Richard, and Meghan O'Sullivan, "Introduction" in Honey and Vinegar, ed. by Haass and O'Sullivan, google books]

Architects of engagement strategies have a **wide variety** of incentives from which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid." Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govem it rank among the most potent incentives in today's global market."

#### Prefer our interpretation

#### Predictability – defines resolutional term “economic engagement” theirs defines economic contacts in relation to engagement

#### Learning about the military is key to changing it in good ways

**Hanson 07** (Victor Davis Hanson, Professor of Classics at CSU Fullerton, “Why Study War?” City Journal, Summer)

It’s no surprise that civilian Americans tend to lack a basic understanding of military matters. Even when I was a graduate student, 30-some years ago, military history—understood broadly as the investigation of why one side wins and another loses a war, and encompassing reflections on magisterial or foolish generalship, technological stagnation or breakthrough, and the roles of discipline, bravery, national will, and culture in determining a conflict’s outcome and its consequences—had already become unfashionable on campus. Today, universities are even less receptive to the subject. This state of affairs is profoundly troubling, for democratic citizenship requires knowledge of war—and now, in the age of weapons of mass annihilation, more than ever. I came to the study of warfare in an odd way, at the age of 24. Without ever taking a class in military history, I naively began writing about war for a Stanford classics dissertation that explored the effects of agricultural devastation in ancient Greece, especially the Spartan ravaging of the Athenian countryside during the Peloponnesian War. The topic fascinated me. Was the strategy effective? Why assume that ancient armies with primitive tools could easily burn or cut trees, vines, and grain on thousands of acres of enemy farms, when on my family farm in Selma, California, it took me almost an hour to fell a mature fruit tree with a sharp modern ax? Yet even if the invaders couldn’t starve civilian populations, was the destruction still harmful psychologically? Did it goad proud agrarians to come out and fight? And what did the practice tell us about the values of the Greeks—and of the generals who persisted in an operation that seemingly brought no tangible results? I posed these questions to my prospective thesis advisor, adding all sorts of further justifications. The topic was central to understanding the Peloponnesian War, I noted. The research would be interdisciplinary—a big plus in the modern university—drawing not just on ancient military histories but also on archaeology, classical drama, epigraphy, and poetry. I could bring a personal dimension to the research, too, having grown up around veterans of both world wars who talked constantly about battle. And from my experience on the farm, I wanted to add practical details about growing trees and vines in a Mediterranean climate. Yet my advisor was skeptical. Agrarian wars, indeed wars of any kind, weren’t popular in classics Ph.D. programs, even though farming and fighting were the ancient Greeks’ two most common pursuits, the sources of anecdote, allusion, and metaphor in almost every Greek philosophical, historical, and literary text. Few classicists seemed to care any more that most notable Greek writers, thinkers, and statesmen—from Aeschylus to Pericles to Xenophon—had served in the phalanx or on a trireme at sea. Dozens of nineteenth-century dissertations and monographs on ancient warfare—on the organization of the Spartan army, the birth of Greek tactics, the strategic thinking of Greek generals, and much more—went largely unread. Nor was the discipline of military history, once central to a liberal education, in vogue on campuses in the seventies. It was as if the university had forgotten that history itself had begun with Herodotus and Thucydides as the story of armed conflicts. What lay behind this academic lack of interest? The most obvious explanation: this was the immediate post-Vietnam era. The public perception in the Carter years was that America had lost a war that for moral and practical reasons it should never have fought—a catastrophe, for many in the universities, that it must never repeat. The necessary corrective wasn’t to learn how such wars started, went forward, and were lost. Better to ignore anything that had to do with such odious business in the first place. The nuclear pessimism of the cold war, which followed the horror of two world wars, also dampened academic interest. The postwar obscenity of Mutually Assured Destruction had lent an apocalyptic veneer to contemporary war: as President Kennedy warned, “Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind.” Conflict had become something so destructive, in this view, that it no longer had any relation to the battles of the past. It seemed absurd to worry about a new tank or a novel doctrine of counterinsurgency when the press of a button, unleashing nuclear Armageddon, would render all military thinking superfluous. Further, the sixties had ushered in a utopian view of society antithetical to serious thinking about war. Government, the military, business, religion, and the family had conspired, the new Rousseauians believed, to warp the naturally peace-loving individual. Conformity and coercion smothered our innately pacifist selves. To assert that wars broke out because bad men, in fear or in pride, sought material advantage or status, or because good men had done too little to stop them, was now seen as antithetical to an enlightened understanding of human nature. “What difference does it make,” in the words of the much-quoted Mahatma Gandhi, “to the dead, the orphans, and the homeless whether the mad destruction is wrought under the name of totalitarianism or the holy name of liberty and democracy?” The academic neglect of war is even more acute today. Military history as a discipline has atrophied, with very few professorships, journal articles, or degree programs. In 2004, Edward Coffman, a retired military history professor who taught at the University of Wisconsin, reviewed the faculties of the top 25 history departments, as ranked by U.S. News and World Report. He found that of over 1,000 professors, only 21 identified war as a specialty. When war does show up on university syllabi, it’s often about the race, class, and gender of combatants and wartime civilians. So a class on the Civil War will focus on the Underground Railroad and Reconstruction, not on Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. One on World War II might emphasize Japanese internment, Rosie the Riveter, and the horror of Hiroshima, not Guadalcanal and Midway. A survey of the Vietnam War will devote lots of time to the inequities of the draft, media coverage, and the antiwar movement at home, and scant the air and artillery barrages at Khe Sanh. Those who want to study war in the traditional way face intense academic suspicion, as Margaret Atwood’s poem “The Loneliness of the Military Historian” suggests: Confess: it’s my profession that alarms you. This is why few people ask me to dinner, though Lord knows I don’t go out of my way to be scary. Historians of war must derive perverse pleasure, their critics suspect, from reading about carnage and suffering. Why not figure out instead how to outlaw war forever, as if it were not a tragic, nearly inevitable aspect of human existence? Hence the recent surge of “peace studies” (see “The Peace Racket”). The university’s aversion to the study of war certainly doesn’t reflect public lack of interest in the subject. Students love old-fashioned war classes on those rare occasions when they’re offered, usually as courses that professors sneak in when the choice of what to teach is left up to them. I taught a number of such classes at California State University, Stanford, and elsewhere. They’d invariably wind up overenrolled, with hordes of students lingering after office hours to offer opinions on the battles of Marathon and Lepanto. Popular culture, too, displays extraordinary enthusiasm for all things military. There’s a new Military History Channel, and Hollywood churns out a steady supply of blockbuster war movies, from Saving Private Ryan to 300. The post–Ken Burns explosion of interest in the Civil War continues. Historical reenactment societies stage history’s great battles, from the Roman legions’ to the Wehrmacht’s. Barnes and Noble and Borders bookstores boast well-stocked military history sections, with scores of new titles every month. A plethora of websites obsess over strategy and tactics. Hit video games grow ever more realistic in their reconstructions of battles. The public may feel drawn to military history because it wants to learn about honor and sacrifice, or because of interest in technology—the muzzle velocity of a Tiger Tank’s 88mm cannon, for instance—or because of a pathological need to experience violence, if only vicariously. The importance—and challenge—of the academic study of war is to elevate that popular enthusiasm into a more capacious and serious understanding, one that seeks answers to such questions as: Why do wars break out? How do they end? Why do the winners win and the losers lose? How best to avoid wars or contain their worst effects? A wartime public illiterate about the conflicts of the past can easily find itself paralyzed in the acrimony of the present. Without standards of historical comparison, it will prove ill equipped to make informed judgments. Neither our politicians nor most of our citizens seem to recall the incompetence and terrible decisions that, in December 1777, December 1941, and November 1950, led to massive American casualties and, for a time, public despair. So it’s no surprise that today so many seem to think that the violence in Iraq is unprecedented in our history. Roughly 3,000 combat dead in Iraq in some four years of fighting is, of course, a terrible thing. And it has provoked national outrage to the point of considering withdrawal and defeat, as we still bicker over up-armored Humvees and proper troop levels. But a previous generation considered Okinawa a stunning American victory, and prepared to follow it with an invasion of the Japanese mainland itself—despite losing, in a little over two months, four times as many Americans as we have lost in Iraq, casualties of faulty intelligence, poor generalship, and suicidal head-on assaults against fortified positions. It’s not that military history offers cookie-cutter comparisons with the past. Germany’s World War I victory over Russia in under three years and her failure to take France in four apparently misled Hitler into thinking that he could overrun the Soviets in three or four weeks—after all, he had brought down historically tougher France in just six. Similarly, the conquest of the Taliban in eight weeks in 2001, followed by the establishment of constitutional government within a year in Kabul, did not mean that the similarly easy removal of Saddam Hussein in three weeks in 2003 would ensure a working Iraqi democracy within six months. The differences between the countries—cultural, political, geographical, and economic—were too great. Instead, knowledge of past wars establishes wide parameters of what to expect from new ones. Themes, emotions, and rhetoric remain constant over the centuries, and thus generally predictable. Athens’s disastrous expedition in 415 BC against Sicily, the largest democracy in the Greek world, may not prefigure our war in Iraq. But the story of the Sicilian calamity does instruct us on how consensual societies can clamor for war—yet soon become disheartened and predicate their support on the perceived pulse of the battlefield. Military history teaches us, contrary to popular belief these days, that wars aren’t necessarily the most costly of human calamities. The first Gulf War took few lives in getting Saddam out of Kuwait; doing nothing in Rwanda allowed savage gangs and militias to murder hundreds of thousands with impunity. Hitler, Mao, Pol Pot, and Stalin killed far more off the battlefield than on it. The 1918 Spanish flu epidemic brought down more people than World War I did. And more Americans—over 3.2 million—lost their lives driving over the last 90 years than died in combat in this nation’s 231-year history. Perhaps what bothers us about wars, though, isn’t just their horrific lethality but also that people choose to wage them—which makes them seem avoidable, unlike a flu virus or a car wreck, and their tolls unduly grievous. Yet military history also reminds us that war sometimes has an eerie utility: as British strategist Basil H. Liddell Hart put it, “War is always a matter of doing evil in the hope that good may come of it.” Wars—or threats of wars—put an end to chattel slavery, Nazism, fascism, Japanese militarism, and Soviet Communism. Military history is as often the story of appeasement as of warmongering. The destructive military careers of Alexander the Great, Caesar, Napoleon, and Hitler would all have ended early had any of their numerous enemies united when the odds favored them. Western air power stopped Slobodan Milošević’s reign of terror at little cost to NATO forces—but only after a near-decade of inaction and dialogue had made possible the slaughter of tens of thousands. Affluent Western societies have often proved reluctant to use force to prevent greater future violence. “War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things,” observed the British philosopher John Stuart Mill. “The decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks that nothing is worth war is much worse.” Indeed, by ignoring history, the modern age is free to interpret war as a failure of communication, of diplomacy, of talking—as if aggressors don’t know exactly what they’re doing. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, frustrated by the Bush administration’s intransigence in the War on Terror, flew to Syria, hoping to persuade President Assad to stop funding terror in the Middle East. She assumed that Assad’s belligerence resulted from our aloofness and arrogance rather than from his dictatorship’s interest in destroying democracy in Lebanon and Iraq, before such contagious freedom might in fact destroy him. For a therapeutically inclined generation raised on Oprah and Dr. Phil—and not on the letters of William Tecumseh Sherman and William Shirer’s Berlin Diary—problems between states, like those in our personal lives, should be argued about by equally civilized and peaceful rivals, and so solved without resorting to violence. Yet it’s hard to find many wars that result from miscommunication. Far more often they break out because of malevolent intent and the absence of deterrence. Margaret Atwood also wrote in her poem: “Wars happen because the ones who start them / think they can win.” Hitler did; so did Mussolini and Tojo—and their assumptions were logical, given the relative disarmament of the Western democracies at the time. Bin Laden attacked on September 11 not because there was a dearth of American diplomats willing to dialogue with him in the Hindu Kush. Instead, he recognized that a series of Islamic terrorist assaults against U.S. interests over two decades had met with no meaningful reprisals, and concluded that decadent Westerners would never fight, whatever the provocation—or that, if we did, we would withdraw as we had from Mogadishu. In the twenty-first century, it’s easier than ever to succumb to technological determinism, the idea that science, new weaponry, and globalization have altered the very rules of war. But military history teaches us that our ability to strike a single individual from 30,000 feet up with a GPS bomb or a jihadist’s efforts to have his propaganda beamed to millions in real time do not necessarily transform the conditions that determine who wins and who loses wars. True, instant communications may compress decision making, and generals must be skilled at news conferences that can now influence the views of millions worldwide. Yet these are really just new wrinkles on the old face of war. The improvised explosive device versus the up-armored Humvee is simply an updated take on the catapult versus the stone wall or the harquebus versus the mailed knight. The long history of war suggests no static primacy of the defensive or the offensive, or of one sort of weapon over the other, but just temporary advantages gained by particular strategies and technologies that go unanswered for a time by less adept adversaries. So it’s highly doubtful, the study of war tells us, that a new weapon will emerge from the Pentagon or anywhere else that will change the very nature of armed conflict—unless some sort of genetic engineering so alters man’s brain chemistry that he begins to act in unprecedented ways. We fought the 1991 Gulf War with dazzling, computer-enhanced weaponry. But lost in the technological pizzazz was the basic wisdom that we need to fight wars with political objectives in mind and that, to conclude them decisively, we must defeat and even humiliate our enemies, so that they agree to abandon their prewar behavior. For some reason, no American general or diplomat seemed to understand that crucial point 16 years ago, with the result that, on the cessation of hostilities, Saddam Hussein’s supposedly defeated generals used their gunships to butcher Kurds and Shiites while Americans looked on. And because we never achieved the war’s proper aim—ensuring that Iraq would not use its petro-wealth to destroy the peace of the region—we have had to fight a second war of no-fly zones, and then a third war to remove Saddam, and now a fourth war, of counterinsurgency, to protect the fledgling Iraqi democracy. Military history reminds us of important anomalies and paradoxes. When Sparta invaded Attica in the first spring of the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides recounts, it expected the Athenians to surrender after a few short seasons of ravaging. They didn’t—but a plague that broke out unexpectedly did more damage than thousands of Spartan ravagers did. Twenty-seven years later, a maritime Athens lost the war at sea to Sparta, an insular land power that started the conflict with scarcely a navy. The 2003 removal of Saddam refuted doom-and-gloom critics who predicted thousands of deaths and millions of refugees, just as the subsequent messy four-year reconstruction hasn’t evolved as anticipated into a quiet, stable democracy—to say the least. The size of armies doesn’t guarantee battlefield success: the victors at Salamis, Issos, Mexico City, and Lepanto were all outnumbered. War’s most savage moments—the Allied summer offensive of 1918, the Russian siege of Berlin in the spring of 1945, the Battle of the Bulge, Hiroshima—often unfold right before hostilities cease. And democratic leaders during war—think of Winston Churchill, Harry Truman, and Richard Nixon—often leave office either disgraced or unpopular. It would be reassuring to think that the righteousness of a cause, or the bravery of an army, or the nobility of a sacrifice ensures public support for war. But military history shows that far more often the perception of winning is what matters. Citizens turn abruptly on any leaders deemed culpable for losing. “Public sentiment is everything,” wrote Abraham Lincoln. “With public sentiment nothing can fail. Without it nothing can succeed. He who molds opinion is greater than he who enacts laws.” Lincoln knew that lesson well. Gettysburg and Vicksburg were brilliant Union victories that by summer 1863 had restored Lincoln’s previously shaky credibility. But a year later, after the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Petersburg, and Cold Harbor battles—Cold Harbor claimed 7,000 Union lives in 20 minutes—the public reviled him. Neither Lincoln nor his policies had changed, but the Confederate ability to kill large numbers of Union soldiers had. Ultimately, public opinion follows the ups and downs—including the perception of the ups and downs—of the battlefield, since victory excites the most ardent pacifist and defeat silences the most zealous zealot. After the defeat of France, the losses to Bomber Command, the U-boat rampage, and the fall of Greece, Singapore, and Dunkirk, Churchill took the blame for a war as seemingly lost as, a little later, it seemed won by the brilliant prime minister after victories in North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy. When the successful military action against Saddam Hussein ended in April 2003, over 70 percent of the American people backed it, with politicians and pundits alike elbowing each other aside to take credit for their prescient support. Four years of insurgency later, Americans oppose a now-orphaned war by the same margin. General George S. Patton may have been uncouth, but he wasn’t wrong when he bellowed, “Americans love a winner and will not tolerate a loser.” The American public turned on the Iraq War not because of Cindy Sheehan or Michael Moore but because it felt that the battlefield news had turned uniformly bad and that the price in American lives and treasure for ensuring Iraqi reform was too dear. Finally, military history has the moral purpose of educating us about past sacrifices that have secured our present freedom and security. If we know nothing of Shiloh, Belleau Wood, Tarawa, and Chosun, the crosses in our military cemeteries are just pleasant white stones on lush green lawns. They no longer serve as reminders that thousands endured pain and hardship for our right to listen to what we wish on our iPods and to shop at Wal-Mart in safety—or that they expected future generations, links in this great chain of obligation, to do the same for those not yet born. The United States was born through war, reunited by war, and saved from destruction by war. No future generation, however comfortable and affluent, should escape that terrible knowledge. What, then, can we do to restore the study of war to its proper place in the life of the American mind? The challenge isn’t just to reform the graduate schools or the professoriate, though that would help. On a deeper level, we need to reexamine the larger forces that have devalued the very idea of military history—of war itself. We must abandon the naive faith that with enough money, education, or good intentions we can change the nature of mankind so that conflict, as if by fiat, becomes a thing of the past. In the end, the study of war reminds us that we will never be gods. We will always just be men, it tells us. Some men will always prefer war to peace; and other men, we who have learned from the past, have a moral obligation to stop them.

#### Neg ground – better disads like overstretch and tech modernization – don’t have contrived internals

#### Limits – affs that explode the topic don’t have an economic component to it

#### Default to reasonability – don’t vote negative if we don’t make the debate impossible – hard debate isn’t impossible

#### Don’t vote on potential abuse round doesn’t set a precedent

## K

### 2ac – framework

#### The Role of the Ballot is to simulate the enactment of the plan—effective choices regarding Latin American foreign policy require the ability to test the real world outcomes of our scholarship and advocacies.

Baxter 10 (Jorge, Education Specialist, Department of Education and Culture in the Organization of American States, Former Coordinator of the Inter-American Program on Education for Democratic Values and Practices at the OAS, PHD in International Comparative Education and Policy from University of Maryland College Park, “Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Inter-American Journal of Education for Democracy, 3(2), 224-254, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/ried/article/viewFile/1016/1307>, Accessed: 7/30/13)OG

In the context of international¶ education cooperation and international¶ development in Latin America, where**¶** there are great asymmetries in power and¶ resources, it seems that this critique could¶ have some validity. However, rather than**¶** concluding that deliberation and participation**¶** should be reduced, one could conclude (as¶ is argued in this paper) that they should**¶** be enhanced and expanded. Those that¶ advocate for a “thicker” democratization in¶ the region would likely advocate for a more**¶** substantive approach to deliberation in policy¶ which establishes certain parameters such¶ as “education is an intrinsic human right,”¶ and which would place an emphasis on¶ achieving quality education outcomes¶ for all as the goal. This does not mean that¶ they would not advocate for deliberation but¶ rather would set parameters for deliberation¶ in order to ensure that the outcomes do not¶ lead to “unjust” policy (e.g., a policy that¶ might promote more inequity in education).¶ Those that advocate for a “thinner” approach¶ to democratization would tend to advocate¶ for a procedural approach to deliberation in¶ education policy and would most likely place¶ emphasis on equal opportunity of access¶ to quality education.¶ Instability critique: Education in Latin¶ America suffers from too much instability and¶ is too politicized. Increasing participation and¶ deliberation would only further politicize the¶ situation and polarize those who advocate for¶ educational reform and those who block it.¶ The average term of a minister of education¶ is one-and-a-half years; each time a new¶ minister comes to office, new policies are¶ passed which, according to deliberative¶ democratic theory, would need to be reasoned¶ and debated with citizens. Deliberation in this¶ context would promote even more instability¶ and would lead to further politicization of¶ education reform.¶ Response: Political instability and¶ lack of continuity in policy reform are serious¶ limitations that to some degree are inherent¶ in democratic institutions and processes. The¶ reality is that if any education reform is to¶ succeed in the long term, it needs more than¶ the efforts of governments or international¶ organizations. It needs the sustained support¶ of stakeholders across sectors (public,¶ private, and civil society) and over time. It¶ has been argued that the main problem in¶ basic education in Latin America is the lack¶ of a broad social consensus, recognizing¶ that there is a problem of equity and quality¶ in the provision of education (Schiefelbein,¶ 1997). This lack of broad social consensus¶ is especially challenging where there is, as¶ noted in the critique, a lack of continuity¶ in education reform. Reform in education¶ takes time, sometimes decades. Ensuring¶ continuity in education reform policies is¶ therefore crucial, and this requires public¶ consensus. Deliberative forums convening**¶** government, private sector, and civil society**¶** groups can contribute to developing this public**¶** consensus and to providing more continuity**¶** in policy. Deliberative forums combined**¶** with collaborative projects can help promote**¶** learning, distribute institutional memory,**¶** support capacity-building efforts, and bring**¶** more resources to bear on the education**¶** reform process. Creating a space for citizens¶ to deliberate on the role of education is¶ fundamental for promoting broad social¶ consensus around education reforms. In Latin**¶** America, the most innovative and successful**¶** reforms have all created multiple and**¶** continuous opportunities for diverse groups**¶** across the education sector and society to¶ provide input and to have opportunities for¶ meaningful collaborative action. International¶ organizations, leveraging their regional and¶ international position, can contribute by¶ promoting policy dialogue and collaborative¶ actions among ministries and also with key¶ stakeholders across sectors. The challenge¶ is to develop a better understanding of how¶ deliberation can be used to promote more¶ collaborative as opposed to more adversarial¶ and partisan forms of politics. This is perhaps¶ one area which deliberative theorists need to¶ explore more.¶ 5. Power critique: The final critique relates¶ the possibility that increasing deliberation¶ and participation can lead to increased¶ inequality. Fung and Wright (2003) note¶ that deliberation can turn into domination¶ in a context where “participants in these¶ processes usually face each other from¶ unequal positions of power.” Every reform**¶** in education creates winners and losers, and**¶** very few create “win-win” situations. Those¶ in power would have to submit to the rules of¶ deliberation and relinquish “control” over the¶ various dimensions of democratic decisionmaking.¶ This is naïve and not politically¶ feasible.¶ Response: This is a valid critique¶ worth considering. Structural inequalities**¶** and asymmetries of power in governments**¶** and international institutions in Latin America**¶** have facilitated domination by elites in terms**¶** of authority, power, and control in politics.**¶** Asymmetries of power in international¶ cooperation in education are also clear,¶ especially when powerful financial (World¶ Bank, IDB, IMF) or political (OAS, UNESCO)¶ organizations engage with local stakeholders¶ and condition policy options with funding¶ or political support. What this paper has¶ argued is relevant again here: that instead of**¶** rejecting further democratization in the face**¶** of these challenges, including the challenge**¶** of elite “domination,” what is needed is more**¶** and better democracy, defined in terms of its**¶** breadth, depth, range, and control. Finally,¶ dealing with elite domination in international**¶** deliberative forums will require conscious and¶ skilled facilitation on the part of international¶ organizations, which themselves are often¶ elitist and hegemonic.¶ Final Thoughts: So What?¶ Perhaps the most critical question¶ that emerges in the argument for increased¶ democratization and deliberation is simply:¶ So what? Does increased democratization and¶ deliberation actually lead to better outcomes¶ in education? More empirical research on this¶ critical question is needed. However, experiments**¶** in deliberative democracy in education reform¶ in Brazil through the UNESCO and Ministry of¶ Education Coordinated Action Plan and Porto¶ Alegre‘s Citizen School, and also to some degree¶ at the international level with the OAS pilot¶ experiment in developing a more democratic¶ model of international cooperation from 2001-¶ 2005, have shown that deliberative processes**¶** can enhance learning on the part of those**¶** participating. Fung and Wright (2003) refer to¶ these experiments in deliberation as “schools¶ of democracy” because participants exercise**¶** their capacities of argument, planning, and¶ evaluation. Deliberation promotes joint reflection¶ and consideration of others’ views. Citizens**¶** who participate in deliberative forums develop**¶** competencies that are important not only for**¶** active citizenship (listening, communication,¶ problem-solving, conflict resolution, selfregulation skills) but also crucial for managing**¶** change and school reform. Many of the same**¶** skills that are developed through citizen**¶** deliberation and participation are also essential**¶** for transforming school cultures, promoting**¶** “learning organizations” (Senge, 2000), fostering**¶** communities of reflective practitioners (Schon,¶ 1991) and developing communities of practice**¶** (Wenger, 2001). There is evidence from some¶ research that democratic interactions can create**¶** knowledge that is more rigorous, precise, and**¶** relevant than that produced in authoritarian**¶** environments (Jaramillo, 2005). Another¶ important aspect of enhancing deliberative¶ democracy and democratization is that it moves¶ from a focus on individuals and their own¶ preferences towards more collective forms of¶ learning and collaboration.¶ Up to now, international organizations¶ have endorsed a “thin” version of democratization¶ that is content with formal and centralized¶ mechanisms of “representation” and “policy¶ dialogue.” If a new, more deliberative and¶ democratic model of cooperation in education in¶ the region were to emerge, what would it look¶ like?¶ First of all, a more deliberative and¶ democratic model of international cooperation in¶ education would involve more direct and deeper**¶** forms of participation from everyday citizens,**¶** including teachers, school directors, families,¶ school communities, students, and mesolevel**¶** actors such as civil society organizations.**¶** This participation would move beyond simple**¶** consultation to more authentic forms of joint**¶** decision-making and deliberation. The model¶ would involve more accountability on the¶ part of international organizations in terms¶ of transparency, and would require injecting**¶** ethical reasoning into policies and programming.¶ In addition, a new more democratic model of**¶** international cooperation would expand the**¶** range of policy options available to countries**¶** through devolution of authority, power, and¶ control, combined with oversight and horizontal¶ accountability mechanisms. A more democratic**¶** model of international cooperation would stress**¶** valuing, systematizing, and disseminating**¶** local knowledge and innovation. Finally,**¶** democratization and deliberation in international**¶** cooperation in education would lead to enhanced**¶** learning and agency on the part of participating**¶** countries, groups, and individuals, and thus**¶** contribute to better outcomes in terms of quality**¶** and equity in education at national and local¶ levels.

#### Debating about policy towards Latin America is valuable – without it change is impossible and their discourse gets coopted

Ried Ijed ’10- Ried Ijed is the Revista interamericana de Educación para la Democracia Interamerican Journal of Education for Democracy, (“Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Vol 3 No. 2, December 2010)

While the discourse of international organizations has changed over the past decade to emphasize more local participation, there continues to be a disjuncture between “explicit” statements embodying democratic values and ideals, and the actual practices within these organizations (Samoff, 2004). There are potentially several factors (both political and technical) that lead to disjuncture between policy and practice. Among the most commonly cited of political factors is the tendency for international organizations to co-opt discourses about participation in order to gain legitimacy, but without showing any real commitment to a democratic transformation and the devolution of power, authority, and control (see Klees, 2002). Democratization policies in these contexts are merely “symbolic,” in that at a public level the problem is recognized but at the implementation level they are neither supported with adequate resources nor sufficiently specific enough to be operationalized (Stromquist, 2003). Technical factors may include the inherent limitations on representation in democratic processes, or the lack of financial resources, technical know- how, and skills required to implement changes and mechanisms that would allow for more democratic participation.

#### The plan says Mexico is key to pick up the slack it acknowledges we are relient on them

### No solvo- hallucination

**The alternative is stuck in a world of hallucination and just reifies the heirchies it critiques**

**Guattari and Rolnik, schitzoanalysts, revolutionaries, 1986**

**[Felix and Suely, Molecular Revolution in Brazil, p. 120-121]**

Comment: It's good that you mentioned those homosexuals who worked within the system as lawyers and succeeded in shaking it up. Here, everyone looks down on the institutional part.¶ Guattari: That's silly.¶ Comment: **They think that dealing with the institutional side is reformism, that it doesn't change anything.** As far as they're concerned, the institutions should be ignored because only one kind of thing is worthwhile, anarchism—which I question deeply**. I think it's very naive**, as you yourself say, **to ignore the state on the basis that "it's useless," or "it oppresses us," and therefore to leave it aside and try to do something totally from outside, as though it might be possible for us to destroy it like that.**¶Suely Rolnik: This malaise in relation to institutions is nothing new; on the contrary, **the feeling is particularly strong in our generation which, since the 1960s, has taken institutions as one of its main targets**. But it's true that the malaise has been especially pronounced in Brazil over the last few years, and in my view this must have to do with an absolutely objective (and obvious) fact, which is the hardness of the dictatorship to which we were subjected for so long. The rigidity of that regime is embodied in all the country's institutions, in one way or another; in fact, that constituted an important factor for the permanence of the dictatorship in power over so many years.¶ **But I think that this antiinstitutional malaise, whatever its cause, doesn't end there: the feeling that the institutions are contaminated territories, and the conclusion that nothing should be invested in them, is often the expression of a defensive role. This kind of sensation is,** in my view, **the flip side of the fascination with the institution that characterizes the "bureaucratic libido."** These two attitudes really satisfy the same need, which is to use the prevailing forms, the instituted, as the sole, exclusive parameter in the organization of oneself and of relations with the other, and thus avoid succumbing to the danger of collapse that might be brought about by any kind of change. **Those are two styles of symbiosis with the institution: either "gluey" adhesion and identification (**those who adopt this style base their identity on the "instituted"), **or else repulsion and counteridentification** (those who adopt this style base their **identity on negation of the "instituted," as if there were something "outside" the institutions, a supposed "alternative" space to this world**).¶ Seen in this light, both **"alternativism" and "bureaucratism" restrict themselves to approaching the world from the viewpoint of its forms and representations, from a molar viewpoint; they protect themselves against accessing the molecular plane, where new sensations are being produced and composed and ultimately force the creation of new forms of reality**,. They both reflect a blockage of instituting power, an impossibility of surrender to the processes of singularization, a need for conservation of the prevailing forms, a difficulty in gaining access to the molecular plane, where the new is engendered. I**t's more difficult, to perceive this in the case of "alternativism," because it involves the hallucination of a supposedly parallel world that** ¶ **emanates the illusion of unfettered autonomy and freedom of creation;** and just when we think we've got away from "squareness" we risk succumbing to it again, in a more disguised form. In this respect, I agree with you: the institutions aren't going to be changed by pretending that they don't exist. Nonetheless, it's necessary to add two reserves. In the first place, **it's obvious that not every social experimentation qualified by the name of "alternative" is marked by this defensive hallucination of a parallel world**. And secondly, x it's self-evident that in order to bear the harshness of an authoritarian regime there is a tendency to make believe that itdoesn't exist, so as not to have to enter into contact with sensations of frustration and powerlessness that go beyond the limit of tolerability (indeed, this is a general reaction before any traumatic experience). And in order to survive, people try in so far as possible to create other territories of life, which are often clandestine.

### Rejection Turn

#### Our form of colonization is selfless – It seeks to maintain states and solve development

Elshtain, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School, ‘03 (Jean Bethke, “Just War Against Terrorism” pg. 166)

Sometimes the most effective new frameworks are old ones resituated in a new reality. That is why some have called for a return of imperialism— not the bad old imperialism that colonized and took all power for governance out of the hands of indigenous peoples, carved up continents with no sense of tribal and naturally occurring borders and boundaries, and left a legacy of bitterness. Rather, the sort of imperialism that commentators like Sebastian Mallaby and Michael Ignatieff are groping toward is an image of the world's great superpower taking on an enormous burden and doing so with a relatively, though not entirely, selfless intent. The imperialism they suggest is not one of colonial states dominated by provincial governors, but rather a form of nation-building that is primarily concerned with a new version of deterrence. What is being deterred or forestalled are failed states, within which hapless citizens are victimized by the ruthless and terrorists are given carte blanche to operate. When states fail, we approach something like the nightmare of Thomas Hobbes's war of all against all.

### 2ac Intersectionality

**The alt fails- it doesn’t recognize intersectionality and breeds more structural violence**

**Escobar 2** [Arturo, department of anthropology at university of north Carolina chapel hill, ““Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise”: The Latin American modernity/coloniality Research Program”, http://apse.or.cr/webapse/pedago/enint/escobar03.pdf]

In a more recent text, and building on post-colonial and feminist theory, **Vuola** (2003) **renews her call for taking seriously the heterogeneity and multiplicity ofthe subject of liberation** (theology and philosophy), **namely “the poor” –and, one may add, the subaltern**, in the MC project. In other words,**she is calling for a politics of representation of the poor and the subaltern that fully acknowledges this multiplicity; in the case of women, this means addressing themes that have been absent from the discussion, such as violence against women, reproductive rights and sexuality, and giving complete visibility to the agency of women**. In other words, **the subject of the colonial difference is not an undifferentiated, gender-neutral subject** (**or differentiated only in terms of race and class**); **there are differences in the way subaltern groups are objects of power and subjects of agency**. To acknowledge this might change, to paraphrase, not only the contents but also the terms of the conversation. **That women are othe rin relation to men** –and certainly treated assuch by phallogocentric social and human sciences—**certainly should have consequences for a perspective centered precisely on exteriority and difference.** What Vuola points at is the fact that whereas the discourse of the (mostly male still) MC group is illuminating and radical in so many ways, and as such taken seriously by feminists, it largely excludes women and women’s theoretical and political concerns. **There seems to be a conflict here between discourse and practice as far as women is concerned.** Finally, the feminist deconstruction of religious fundamentalism,something that is not well known in eitherfeministsocialscience orthe MC project, is also of relevance to the engendering ofthe MC project. **As a broad political movement, transnational feminism(s) is developing new approaches to formulating intercultural criteria for human rights, especially women'srights, and for analyzing the truth claims on which these are based** (Vuola 2002). **New works on transnational feminism deal with race, gender and culture issues in ways that resonate** with the concerns of the MC project (see, e.g, Shohat, ed. 1998; Bahavani, Foran and Kurian, eds. 2003). .

### 2ac Agency

**Even if Borders split up the world artificially they are key to preserving our ontological connection to the world and pre-requisite for political agency**

**Parker and Addler-Nissen 12**, Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark, 2012 [Noel and Rebecca, “Picking and Choosing the ‘Sovereign’ Border: A Theory of Changing State Bordering Practices”, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2012.660582>]

**We can ﬁrst observe that borders help fulﬁl epistemological conditions. Borders produce particular conditions for understanding ‘reality’. We who are inside the border are also expected to possess greater knowledge of insiders than of outsiders, which in turn reduces uncertainties regarding our common knowledge on the inside. The border is frequently a bulwark sustaining commonly agreed measures of reality** (such as national-currency measures for inﬂation or relative welfare). **The border slices the world up into different pieces of reality that we cannot know equally well. That increases as well the plausibility of any assertion regarding the circumstances, gains or losses within our border. Hence, other things being equal, borders help promote the idea that there are fewer uncertainties in communications between insiders by comparison with communications with those on the outside. This leads to an assumption that we will be able to agree on the terms used to evaluate changes and preferences – even the order of priorities, which is a pre-condition of political decisions.** Put in a nutshell, the border provides conditions for greater certainty and agreement for those within it. Thompson also makes explicit **an ontological claim for the border/boundary which is implicit in post-structuralism’s prioritisation of dif- ferences as against commonalities: namely, that ‘...borders exist “before” entities ...’ – that is to say, borders are ontologically prior to speciﬁc enti- ties. Borders help constitute the way we conceive the world**. This can be demonstrated, inter alia, on the basis of the epistemological claims above. **For those epistemological consequences of boundaries provide key onto- logical pre-conditions for the continuity of the given social particular as an integrated entity; and hence also for its identity**.14 The ‘fact’ of the border helps produce shared understandings of the identities of particulars, both internal and external to the particular itself. This includes understandings of internal variations and sub-categories (constituencies, classes ... ) between insiders/members of the given social particular. The self-identities of mem- bers and sub-categories are grounded in, and thus far validated, by seeing those particulars in relation to each other.15 **Likewise, the boundary sustains any determination of the collectivity** (the ‘nation’, or whatever it may be) **whose interests may be the basis for decisions and actions on its behalf. This**, as Rokkan noted,16 **is especially signiﬁcant in democratic collectivities, where a large self-aware demos is postulated as the ground for decisions that need to accord in some way with the preference of an indeterminable category, the ordinary mass of the people. The** above **ontological effects of borders yield yet further consequences. For borders provide pre-conditions for determinations of the situation of insiders relative to outsiders: claims regarding presumed and/or potential different conditions** (be it better or worse) **for insiders than for outsiders**.17 **The same could be said of any impression of greater/lesser** (or poten- tially greater/lesser**) welfare than outsiders**. **Only with these kinds of claims and impressions in place, can an additional, politically important category of knowledge have meaning: assertions about potential improvements or deteriorations in conditions for the inside**.18 If the existence of the subjects who experience comparative well-being were not given, we would not ﬁnd meaning in headlines such as ‘Danish schools worst on PISA tests’.19 A fortiori threats which it may be necessary to protect again

### 2ac No Conflict

**Borders in Latin America may contribute to rivalry, but do not cause conflict – Studies prove**

**Trinkunas 12**

[Harold, Naval Postgraduate School, Maiah Jaskoski- Naval Postgraduate School, Borders and Borderlands in the Americas- PASCC Report Number 2012 009]

**Border policies are rooted in a deep history of partial, problematic state building in the region. Historically, Latin American states have engaged in rivalry rather than war. Rivalry benefits** these states **because it enables the development of nationalism** and nationality. Rivalry **promotes state coherence and acts as an attractor for weak central governments**, using nationalism to retain some loyalty and some authority over populations in their borderlands.8 **Though rivalry impedes interstate cooperation to resolve border issues in some key cases in the Americas** (Peru, Bolivia, and Chile; Venezuela and Colombia**), it does not rise to such a level that it generates the cycle of international conflict,** defense preparedness, taxation, and popular mobilization. This means that Central and South America did not experience the type of state building that led to the development of hard fiscal/military/industrial states in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries.9 This historically limited state capacity across much of the region to address border security issues unilaterally, but rivalry also limited the possibility for cooperation across borders to address security and other dimensions of borderlands. **This project found no cases in the Americas in which borders were seriously at risk of provoking international war, even in the cases that were most ideologically polarized,** as was the case on the Colombian-Venezuelan and Colombian-Ecuadorean borders. **While we still see the militarization of borders as vehicles for signaling during international disputes, we found that leaders in the contemporary Americas were constrained by domestic stakeholders and economic considerations**. In fact, **much of the violence identified in borderlands has occurred in precisely those spaces where international relations are smoothest, especially due to strong economic relations**: in Central America, regional economic integration and cross-border flows are growing even as states struggle to maintain border security.10 **The peaceful settlement of international disputes** and uti posidetis (the legal concept that borders are based on those inherited from the colonial period) **has become the norm across the region**. In some cases, there is an increased tendency to legalize territorial claims, settling border disputes in international tribunals and through judicial arbitration. This means that **states do not necessarily view their borders as matters of existential import, but at most as subjects that may be negotiated**.11

### 2ac No cultural destruction

**Reject their generic link claims - borders produce cultural connections as much as they exclude.**

**Parker 12**

[Noel, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK, Nick Vaughan-Williams, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, Geopolitics, 17:4, 727-733, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2012.706111]

On the other hand**, bordering practices** – and the various forms of contestation and resistance they often give rise to – **are not treated simply as normatively ‘bad’ phenomena**. Rumford, for example, highlights the ways in which **borders are also sites of ‘cultural encounter’ rather than simply a mechanism of division and exclusion**. Indeed, **even in some of the world’s most persistently troubled border-zones, such as the India-Pakistan region, the border can be said to act as an ‘interlinking and cooperative space**’ (Bouzas, this issue). On this view, as Salter might say about Bouzas’ material, ‘**borders then knit the world together’ even though the colonial ‘sutures’ remain living after-traces of past violence**. Methodologically, the empirical thrust of CBS research is conversant with anthropological approaches to the phenomenology of the border and indeed several of the pieces included here reflect extensive ethnographic fieldwork – for example Bouzas’ interviews with migrants in the border villages near Kargil, Pakistan and Gielis’s time spent with Dutch migrants in Kranenburg.

## Counterplan

### 2ac – certainty key

#### Certainty key – prevent loss of production and hit to national security

General Adams, 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “REMAKING AMERICAN SECURITY: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES & NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ACROSS THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)djm

Accordingly, this report examined a series of defense industrial base sectors that are vital to U.S. security. Some are especially important and require immediate attention to prevent critical loss of supply or production capacity, constituting an immediate threat to national security. Some sectors are vulnerable to immediate disruption arising from excessive or misaligned foreign dependency, while others face longer-term challenges. In general, the risks posed to many sectors of the defense industrial base may prove very difficult to fix, because they are a part of powerful, prevailing trends in the international technology market and the global economy. All of these challenges demand our best strategic thinking about how to prevent or contain significant and potentially dangerous risks to national security. This report investigates those risks and is a call to action to mitigate them.

### 2ac – congress key

#### Doesn’t solve – congressional jurisdiction

US COTA 91 – Congress Office of Technology Assessment (“Redesigning Defense: Planning the Transition to the Future U.S. Defense Industrial Base”, OTA-ISC-500, July 1991, http://ota-cdn.fas.org/reports/9134.pdf)//javi

The objective of greater NADIB integration would be to rationalize defense production within the North American continent by enabling both countries to specialize in the areas where they are most proficient. Congress could help achieve this goal by removing some or all of the existing legislative and policy barriers to free trade in defense and dual-use products between the two countries and by appropriating funds for the codevelopment and coproduction of defense equipment by U.S. and Canadian firms. The repeal of U.S. protectionist legislation might be made conditional on Ottawa’s willingness to drop its offset requirements. Such congressional action would need to be supplemented with additional measures by the executive branch. For example, the U.S. and Canadian defense departments might seek improved coordination in defense R&D policy and a more liberal policy on cross-border transfers of technology so that the research of both countries could be utilized more efficiently. Joint U.S.-Canadian industrial preparedness planning might also be expanded.

### 2ac – mexico says no

#### Say no – perceived as interference in domestic affairs

Starr 9 - director of the U.S.-Mexico Network and an associate professor of teaching in the School of International Relations and in Public Diplomacy

(Pamela, “Mexico and the United States: A window of opportunity?,” http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=35)

Beyond the current economic crisis, the United States can best promote regional ¶ economic competitiveness in three ways. First, it should remain patient through what is ¶ destined to be a slow process of economic reform and policy adjustment in Mexico. As ¶ Mexico struggles to implement these changes, “advice” coming from Washington would be ¶ seen as unwarranted interference in Mexican domestic affairs and thus be counterproductive. ¶ Second, President Obama’s stated desire to augment significantly the U.S. budget for ¶ economic aid should include an increase in targeted assistance programs for Mexico. This ¶ effort should focus on two of the primary obstacles to growth in the Mexican economy – an ¶ inadequately educated workforce and insufficient infrastructure. It could do this by increasing ¶ current U.S. programs to train rural teachers, provide student scholarships, and determine the ¶ feasibility of large infrastructure projects, and by focusing overall on efforts that complement private sector investment and Mexican government programs.

### 2ac – key to navy

#### Mexico is key to the navy – copper nickel tubing

General Adams, 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “REMAKING AMERICAN SECURITY: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES & NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ACROSS THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)

In addition to these domestic companies, the European conglomerate KME and several companies in Mexico also produce Cu-Ni tubing for the U.S. Navy. However, other than Ansonia Brass & Copper, KME is the only company capable of producing this larger diameter tubing according to U.S. military specifications. As a result, the U.S. domestic production capability of Cu-Ni tubing is at risk, potentially leaving the U.S. Navy solely dependent on foreign manufacturers for this important supply chain.

### Japan

#### Carriers are key to prevent Taiwan invasion and save the US-Japan alliance

Loo 09, Board Member at Large of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs, Distinguished Fellow of the International Assessment and Strategy Center, one of the founders of Taiwan’s Formosan independence movement, (Jay T., April 3rd, “A storm is gathering in the Strait”, published under the pen-name Li Thian-hok, Taipei Times)

After years of double-digit increases in China’s military budget and intensive efforts to modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China now has the capacity to invade and overwhelm Taiwan in the absence of US intervention. But the US is preoccupied with the financial crisis and the intractable wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Pakistan. The US military is stretched thin — especially in East Asia. The Taiwanese government, meanwhile, has been feckless in its national defense efforts for more than a decade. China is now Taiwan’s largest export destination. Most of Taiwan’s high-tech manufacturing has moved to China. The resultant outflow of capital, technology and manpower is hollowing out Taiwan’s economy. Yet the administration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is determined to sign an economic cooperation framework agreement to turn Taiwan’s economy into an appendage of China’s economy. This would not only erode the standard of living in Taiwan but irreparably damage US-Taiwan relations. James Lilley, former US ambassador to China and Taipei, has observed: “Although the Taiwanese love freedom, they love money more.” So what are the practical implications of the above developments? While the TRA stipulates that the “President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan,” in practice Beijing’s reaction is now one of the main considerations. While the TRA imposes on the US a moral obligation to come to Taiwan’s aid in case of Chinese military aggression, William Murray, a professor at the US Naval War College, wrote in a celebrated paper last fall that if China attacks Taiwan, the US should hold back, observe the war’s progress and take its time in deciding whether to intervene. His reason: The US may risk a strategic failure, in other words, the US may be defeated if it tried to rescue Taiwan. Today there is a gathering crisis in the Taiwan Strait that seems to escape the attention of much of Washington’s policy establishment. A vast majority of the people on Taiwan would reject Chinese communist rule, yet the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government is pursuing a policy of incremental capitulation by reducing the budget and size of Taiwan’s military, deepening the dependency of its economy on China and downgrading Taiwan’s international status. Economic integration measures negotiated by the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT are implemented by the Executive Yuan without public debate or approval by the Legislative Yuan. Taiwan is in danger of being delivered into Beijing’s hands by stealth. While most observers believe there has been an easing of tension in the Taiwan Strait because of the concessions the Ma administration has made to China, China has in fact added another 100 missiles to its arsenal targeting Taiwan since Ma took office. The PLA’s preparations for war against Taiwan have not slackened. Because of declining exports, more than 20 million migrant workers in China have lost their jobs. Ann Marie Slaughter, chief of the US State Department’s policy planning staff, has pointed out that China could launch a military venture against a neighbor (meaning Taiwan) to divert attention from growing social unrest at home. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) wants to visit Taiwan and Premier Liu Chao-shiuan (劉兆玄) has said that Wen would be welcome. Such a visit could trigger massive, bloody protests. The resulting chaos could provide the PLA with a pretext to invade Taiwan. Taiwan is facing double jeopardy: an external military threat from China and internal subversion by the Ma government, which is dominated by radical elements in the KMT who are collaborating with Beijing to demolish Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy as expediently as possible. If Taiwan were to fall by PLA coercion or internal subversion, the US would suffer a **geostrategic disaster**. The sea lanes and air space around Taiwan are critical to the survival of Japan and South Korea. Once in control of Taiwan, China would be in position to pressure Japan and South Korea to become its vassal states. Given Japan’s unstable domestic politics and its aversion to nuclear weapons, chances are Japan would cave once the credibility of the US as keeper of peace in East Asia had been lost. With the demise of the US-Japan military alliance, the US would be forced to retreat all the way back to Hawaii. Using coercion against Taiwan would mean that China had irreversibly forgone the path of development that would lead to a humane, democratic society in favor of keeping its authoritarian model. This would **inevitably bring it into conflict with the US**. The greatest threat to the US’ homeland security is not a terrorist attack with a dirty bomb; it is an unexpected, **nuclear Pearl Harbor.**  The basic US national security strategy is misdirected. In order to keep the peace in East Asia and ultimately to protect homeland security, the US must continue to support democracy and uphold the Taiwanese people’s legitimate aspirations for freedom. To keep the peace in the Taiwan Strait and to encourage China to pursue peaceful development, we urge the US president and Congress to take the following steps: First, reaffirm the US policy that the future of Taiwan must be determined by peaceful means and that the US opposes any unilateral action to change the status quo; Second, deploy at least two aircraft carrier task forces in the Western Pacific and secure basing rights in the Philippines and the Ryukyu Islands as part of US efforts to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion;

#### US-China war causes extinction

**Glaser 11**, **PolSci Prof at Goerge Washington,** (Charles, March/April, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, Vol 90 Issue 2, EbscoHost)

ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN? THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

#### The alliance solves multiple scenarios for nuclear war

Armitage 2K - former Deputy Secretary of State, 10-11-2K (Richard, “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” INSS Special Report, Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University)

Asia, in the throes of historic change, should carry major weight in the calculus of American political, security, economic, and other interests. Accounting for 53 percent of the world’s population, 25 percent of the global economy, and nearly $600 billion annually in two-way trade with the United States, Asia is vital to American prosperity. Politically, from Japan and Australia, to the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, countries across the region are demonstrating the universal appeal of democratic values. China is facing momentous social and economic changes, the consequences of which are not yet clear. Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region’s de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world’s second-largest economy and a well equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America’s global security strategy. Japan, too, is experiencing an important transition. Driven in large part by the forces of globalization, Japan is in the midst of its greatest social and economic transformation since the end of World War II. Japanese society, economy, national identity, and international role are undergoing change that is potentially as fundamental as that Japan experienced during the Meiji Restoration. The effects of this transformation are yet to be fully understood. Just as Western countries dramatically underestimated the potential of the modern nation that emerged from the Meiji Restoration, many are ignoring a similar transition the effects of which, while not immediately apparent, could be no less profound. For the United States, the key to sustaining and enhancing the alliance in the 21st century lies in reshaping our bilateral relationship in a way that anticipates the consequences of changes now underway in Japan. Since the end of World War II, Japan has played a positive role in Asia. As a mature democracy with an educated and active electorate, Japan has demonstrated that changes in government can occur peacefully. Tokyo has helped to foster regional stability and build confidence through its proactive diplomacy and economic involvement throughout the region. Japan’s participation in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in the early 1990s, its various defense exchanges and security dialogues, and its participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum and the new “Plus Three” grouping are further testimony to Tokyo’s increasing activism. Most significantly, Japan’s alliance with the United States has served as the foundation for regional order. We have considered six key elements of the U.S.-Japan relationship and put forth a bipartisan action agenda aimed at creating an enduring alliance foundation for the 21st century. Post-Cold War Drift As partners in the broad Western alliance, the United States and Japan worked together to win the Cold War and helped to usher in a new era of democracy and economic opportunity in Asia. In the aftermath of our shared victory, however, the course of U.S.-Japan relations has wandered, losing its focus and coherence— notwithstanding the real threats and potential risks facing both partners. Once freed from the strategic constraints of containing the Soviet Union, both Washington and Tokyo ignored the real, practical, and pressing needs of the bilateral alliance. Well intentioned efforts to find substitutes for concrete collaboration and clear goal-setting have produced a diffuse dialogue but no clear definition of a common purpose. Efforts to experiment with new concepts of international security have proceeded fitfully, but without discernable results in redefining and reinvigorating bilateral security ties. This lack of focus and follow-through has been evident in both countries. Some in Japan have been drawn to the notion of “Asianization” and the hope that economic interdependence and multilateral institutions would put the region on a path similar to that of Europe. Many in the United States regarded the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to return to economic priorities. The early 1990s was a period of heightened bilateral tensions, primarily over the question of access to Japanese markets. Some Americans saw economic competition from Japan as a threat. In the past five years, however, trade tensions have diminished. Envy and concern over Japanese economic prowess have turned to dismay over the Japanese recession and building financial crisis. Neither country dealt with the need to redefine and reinvigorate the alliance. In fact, both took it for granted. The drift in the alliance was obvious until the mid-1990s when the crisis on the Korean peninsula—punctuated by the horror of the Okinawa rape incident— captured the attention of policymakers in Washington and Tokyo. These episodes prompted them to recognize belatedly the costs of neglecting the bilateral relationship. The subsequent Taiwan Strait confrontation in March 1996 gave even more impetus to efforts on both sides of the Pacific to reaffirm the bilateral security alliance. The 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration went a long way toward directing attention in both capitals toward the need to refurbish the alliance, and led to concrete changes that updated defense ties in the form of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the 1996 report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, and the bilateral agreement to cooperate in theater missile defense research. But the symbolism of the 1996 declaration stood alone, unsupported by sustained high-level attention. As a result, the United States and Japan soon returned to bickering and poor policy coordination. The costs of the deterioration in the U.S.- Japan relationship have been insidious as well as obvious. By the end of the 1990s, many U.S. policymakers had lost interest in a Japan that appeared incapable of renewing itself. Indeed, Japan’s prolonged recession has discouraged or dispirited even some Japanese officials. In Tokyo, many see Washington as arrogant and unable to recognize that its prescriptions are not universally applicable to others’ economic, political, and social needs. A number of government officials and opinion-makers perceived the U.S. approach as a self-serving rationale for commercial and economic interests and grew resentful of a United States seemingly preoccupied with its own self-centered version of globalization. It has been obvious that U.S. attention and interests have turned elsewhere in Asia. More recently, the principal focus of American policymakers has been the bilateral relationship with China—a relationship characterized by a series of crises ever since the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrations. Neither Washington nor Tokyo followed through aggressively on the security agenda set forth in the 1996 declaration, in large measure because of concerns over Beijing’s hostile reaction to the reinvigoration of the security partnership. Beijing let it be known in no uncertain terms that it regarded the U.S.-Japan partnership as an important element of a broader effort by Washington to constrain its regional diplomacy. And as the United States and—to a lesser extent—Japan sought to improve relations with China, both demonstrated a clear desire to downplay the notion of a containment strategy. In fact, the only active security dialogue between the United States and Japan has been a byproduct of a desire to coax North Korea out of its self-imposed isolation. The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea all concur that close cooperation and unity of purpose offer the most effective strategy to deal with Pyongyang. This record of diffidence, uncertainty, and indirection has no single father, nor does it support an oversimplified laying of blame. Rather, it demands a recognition that the time has arrived for renewed attention to improving, reinvigorating, and refocusing the U.S.- Japan alliance. Both the United States and Japan face an uncertain security environment in Asia at a time of political transition and important change in both countries—for the United States, a new national leadership, and for Japan, a continuing process of economic, political, and social transformation. At the same time, political and economic uncertainties in China and Russia, the fragile nature of detente on the Korean peninsula, and the prospect of protracted instability in Indonesia— all pose shared challenges. For those who argue that Japan is a “wasting asset” in irreversible decline, it might be useful to recall that it has been only a decade since it was taken as an article of faith that American power was ebbing on the international scene. It would be foolhardy to underestimate the enduring dimensions of Japanese power, much as it was unwise for some Japanese to dismiss the latent and enduring qualities of American power in the 1980s and 1990s. Politics Over the past decade, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), faced with internal divisions, a clash of traditional interest group agendas, and a growing split among key constituencies, has focused primarily on hanging on to its dwindling power. At the same time, the political opposition has failed to produce credible, well-conceived policy proposals. The net effect is an LDP struggling to maintain its grip on the reins of government, an opposition unable to provide a governing alternative, and a Japanese public, faced with a lack of credible alternative leadership, reluctantly returning the LDP to office. The result has been a govern government stuck in neutral, incapable of more than muddling through. Nevertheless, the necessity of economic reform and restructuring, driven by the pressures of a relentless globalization of the international economy, are likely to lead to political change. These economic forces are breaking apart the monopoly power of the so-called Iron Triangle—the heretofore collusive relationships among politicians, business, and the bureaucracies—and making power more diffuse. The Japanese political order is experiencing protracted change. Political changes in Japan could lead to unprecedented opportunities to reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan relationship—as well as test it further. The end of bipolar ideological confrontation in Japanese politics and the emergence of a new pragmatism about security affairs among a younger generation of elected officials provide fertile soil for creative new approaches to leadership. It would be unrealistic to expect the current leadership suddenly to embrace reform or to assume a higher profile on the global stage. The demands of Japan’s parliamentary system make it difficult to implement policies, that require short-term pain in exchange for longterm gain. The political system is risk-averse. But the successor generations of politicians and the public-at-large also recognize that economic power alone will no longer be enough to secure Japan’s future. Moreover, the Japanese public, by giving official standing to the national flag and anthem, and in focusing on such territorial claims as the Senkaku islands, has evidenced a new respect for the sovereignty and integrity of the nation state. The implications for the U.S.-Japan relationship stemming from these changes are profound. A similar process is at work in the United States. The growing role of Congress as a force in foreign policy, the rising influence of state and local governments, and the dramatic transformation of the private sector as the initiator of economic change—driven by technology and the empowerment of the individual— are altering the influence of once-central foreign policymaking institutions. But, just as Japan’s risk-averse political leadership has held back the nation’s economic transformation, the lack of clear direction from Washington also has taken a toll. Episodic executive branch leadership has failed to produce a well-conceived game plan for America’s relationship with Japan. This, in turn, has accelerated the erosion of political support and popular understanding of the importance of the alliance. In short, the political, economic, and social changes underway in the United States put an even greater premium on executive branch leadership in foreign affairs. If the United States can exercise leadership— that is to say, excellence without arrogance— in its relations with Japan, the two countries will be better able to realize the full potential for cooperation nurtured during the past 50 years. If the changes underway in Japan ultimately produce a stronger, more responsive political and economic system, the synergy in U.S.-Japan relations will enhance our abilities to play an engaged, mutually supportive, and fundamentally constructive role in regional and global arenas in the years to come Security Because the stakes are so high in Asia, it is urgent that the United States and Japan develop a common perception and approach regarding their relationship in the 21st century. The potential for conflict in Asia is lowered dramatically by a visible and “real” U.S.-Japan defense relationship. The use of bases granted by Japan allows the U.S. to affect the security environment from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf. The revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the basis for joint defense planning, should be regarded as the floor—not the ceiling—for an expanded Japanese role in the transpacific alliance, and the uncertainties of the post-Cold War regional setting require a more dynamic approach to bilateral defense planning. Japan’s prohibition against collective self defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation. This is a decision that only the Japanese people can make. The United States has respected the domestic decisions that form the character of Japanese security policies and should continue to do so. But Washington must make clear that it welcomes a Japan that is willing to make a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner. We see the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain as a model for the alliance. This arrangement requires the following elements: Reaffirming the defense commitment. The United States should reaffirm its commitment to the defense of Japan and those areas under the administrative control of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands. Diligent implementation of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, including passage of crisis management legislation. Robust cooperation of all three U.S. armed services with their Japanese counterparts. The U.S. and Japan should strive for greater jointness in the use of facilities and for integration of training activities and should review and update the roles and missions of the Armed Forces agreed upon in 1981. Both partners should invest in training that replicates reality, rather than follows old patterns. They also should define how to assist each other with emerging new challenges, such as international terrorism and transnational criminal activity, as well as longstanding potential threats, and how to collaborate in peacekeeping and peacemaking activities. Full participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions. Japan would need to remove its 1992 self-imposed restraints on these activities so as not to burden other peacekeeping nations. Development of a force structure that has the characteristics of versatility, mobility, flexibility, diversity, and survivability. Any adjustments should not be based on an artificial number, but should reflect the regional security environment. As this process unfolds, changes to force structure should be made through a process of consultation and dialogue, and be mutually agreeable. The United States should take advantage of technological changes and regional developments to restructure its force presence on the archipelago. We should strive to reduce the American military footprint in Japan as long as our capabilities can be maintained. This includes continued consolidation of U.S. bases and rapid implementation of the terms of the 1996 U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement. Making priority availability of U.S. defense technology to Japan. Defense technology must be seen as an essential component of the overall alliance. We should encourage the American defense industry to make strategic alliances with Japanese companies to facilitate a greater two-way flow of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. Broadening the scope of U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation. There will be a healthy debate in both countries arising from the larger role that we advocate for Japan. And U.S. Government officials and lawmakers will have to recognize that Japanese policy will not be identical to American policy in every instance. It is time for burden sharing to evolve into power-sharing and this means that the next administration will have to devote the considerable time that will be necessary to bring this into being. Okinawa A large concentration of U.S. forces in Japan—approximately 75 percent— are stationed on Okinawa. They are situated there because in matters of security, distance matters. Okinawa is positioned at the intersection of the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean—only about one hour’s flying time from Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. The U.S. Air Force base at Kadena provides a critical link to American power projection throughout the region. It is also crucial to the defense of Japan. The III Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa provides a self-sustaining, joint forward echelon for rapid response to problems in the region, ranging from evacuation of noncombatant personnel to serving as cutting edge combat elements to enable large formations to defeat aggression. But the heavy concentration of U.S. forces on Okinawa also creates an obvious burden for Japan and a less obvious one for the United States, arising, for example, from restrictions, such as those on training. Because of their intense operational tempo and younger demographic profile, the Marines have drawn particular scrutiny from a Japanese public ready for some changes in the U.S. military presence in the southernmost prefecture of the country. For their part, the Marines have striven to be better neighbors, but readiness and training have suffered with the growing constraints imposed on them by encroachment around the bases. And while statistics on incidents of misconduct by American service personnel are sharply down, in the current political climate, attention to episodes of deeply unfortunate behavior that do occur is sharply magnified. In 1996, the U.S.–Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement called for a realignment, consolidation, and reduction of U.S. bases on Okinawa. The United States and Japan must complete implementation of that accord, which will reduce U.S. assets by about 5,000 hectares and 11 facilities, including the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma. We believe the SACO agreement should have had an important fourth goal— diversification throughout the Asia-Pacific region. From a military perspective, it is important for U.S. forces to have broad and flexible access across the region. But from a political perspective, it is essential to ease the burden borne by the Okinawans so that our presence is sustainable and credible. American thinking about force structure in Japan must not stop with the SACO accord. The United States should consider broader and more flexible deployment and training options for the Marines throughout the region.

### 1nc – no impact

#### No bio-d impact – it’s resilient

Kareiva et al 12 – Chief Scientist and Vice President, The Nature Conservancy (Peter, Michelle Marvier **--**professor and department chair of Environment Studies and Sciences at Santa Clara University, Robert Lalasz **--** director of science communications for The Nature Conservancy, Winter, “Conservation in the Anthropocene,” http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/past-issues/issue-2/conservation-in-the-anthropocene/)

2. As conservation became a global enterprise in the 1970s and 1980s, the movement's justification for saving nature shifted from spiritual and aesthetic values to focus on biodiversity. Nature was described as primeval, fragile, and at risk of collapse from too much human use and abuse. And indeed, there are consequences when humans convert landscapes for mining, logging, intensive agriculture, and urban development and when key species or ecosystems are lost.¶ But ecologists and conservationists have grossly overstated the fragility of nature, frequently arguing that once an ecosystem is altered, it is gone forever. Some ecologists suggest that if a single species is lost, a whole ecosystem will be in danger of collapse, and that if too much biodiversity is lost, spaceship Earth will start to come apart. Everything, from the expansion of agriculture to rainforest destruction to changing waterways, has been painted as a threat to the delicate inner-workings of our planetary ecosystem.¶ The fragility trope dates back, at least, to Rachel Carson, who wrote plaintively in Silent Spring of the delicate web of life and warned that perturbing the intricate balance of nature could have disastrous consequences.22 Al Gore made a similar argument in his 1992 book, Earth in the Balance.23 And the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment warned darkly that, while the expansion of agriculture and other forms of development have been overwhelmingly positive for the world's poor, ecosystem degradation was simultaneously putting systems in jeopardy of collapse.24¶ The trouble for conservation is that the data simply do not support the idea of a fragile nature at risk of collapse. Ecologists now know that the disappearance of one species does not necessarily lead to the extinction of any others, much less all others in the same ecosystem. In many circumstances, the demise of formerly abundant species can be inconsequential to ecosystem function. The American chestnut, once a dominant tree in eastern North America, has been extinguished by a foreign disease, yet the forest ecosystem is surprisingly unaffected. The passenger pigeon, once so abundant that its flocks darkened the sky, went extinct, along with countless other species from the Steller's sea cow to the dodo, with no catastrophic or even measurable effects.¶ These stories of resilience are not isolated examples -- a thorough review of the scientific literature identified 240 studies of ecosystems following major disturbances such as deforestation, mining, oil spills, and other types of pollution. The abundance of plant and animal species as well as other measures of ecosystem function recovered, at least partially, in 173 (72 percent) of these studies.25¶ While global forest cover is continuing to decline, it is rising in the Northern Hemisphere, where "nature" is returning to former agricultural lands.26 Something similar is likely to occur in the Southern Hemisphere, after poor countries achieve a similar level of economic development. A 2010 report concluded that rainforests that have grown back over abandoned agricultural land had 40 to 70 percent of the species of the original forests.27 Even Indonesian orangutans, which were widely thought to be able to survive only in pristine forests, have been found in surprising numbers in oil palm plantations and degraded lands.28¶ Nature is so resilient that it can recover rapidly from even the most powerful human disturbances. Around the Chernobyl nuclear facility, which melted down in 1986, wildlife is thriving, despite the high levels of radiation.29 In the Bikini Atoll, the site of multiple nuclear bomb tests, including the 1954 hydrogen bomb test that boiled the water in the area, the number of coral species has actually increased relative to before the explosions.30 More recently, the massive 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico was degraded and consumed by bacteria at a remarkably fast rate.31¶ Today, coyotes roam downtown Chicago, and peregrine falcons astonish San Franciscans as they sweep down skyscraper canyons to pick off pigeons for their next meal. As we destroy habitats, we create new ones: in the southwestern United States a rare and federally listed salamander species seems specialized to live in cattle tanks -- to date, it has been found in no other habitat.32 Books have been written about the collapse of cod in the Georges Bank, yet recent trawl data show the biomass of cod has recovered to precollapse levels.33 It's doubtful that books will be written about this cod recovery since it does not play well to an audience somehow addicted to stories of collapse and environmental apocalypse.¶ Even that classic symbol of fragility -- the polar bear, seemingly stranded on a melting ice block -- may have a good chance of surviving global warming if the changing environment continues to increase the populations and northern ranges of harbor seals and harp seals. Polar bears evolved from brown bears 200,000 years ago during a cooling period in Earth's history, developing a highly specialized carnivorous diet focused on seals. Thus, the fate of polar bears depends on two opposing trends -- the decline of sea ice and the potential increase of energy-rich prey. The history of life on Earth is of species evolving to take advantage of new environments only to be at risk when the environment changes again.¶ The wilderness ideal presupposes that there are parts of the world untouched by humankind, but today it is impossible to find a place on Earth that is unmarked by human activity. The truth is humans have been impacting their natural environment for centuries. The wilderness so beloved by conservationists -- places "untrammeled by man"34 -- never existed, at least not in the last thousand years, and arguably even longer.

## Politics

### 2AC Wont Pass

#### It won’t pass and Obamacare is taking away focus and energy

Berman 10-29-13 Russell Berman, The HILL “ObamaCare steals spotlight from push on immigration” [http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/188417-obamacare-steals-spotlight-from-push-on-immigration][MG]

The troubled rollout of the healthcare law has thrown a wrench into President Obama’s push for immigration reform. The White House and reform advocates in both parties have sought to refocus attention back to immigration following the 16-day government shutdown, but the problems plaguing the new federal insurance exchange website have dominated headlines. The White House is getting a boost from a coalition of 600 faith, law enforcement and business leaders that plan to descend Tuesday on Capitol Hill to urge the House to take up immigration legislation before the end of the year. “We’ve got to get Congress and the American public to focus on immigration because we’ve got such a short time to get it on the floor,” said Rep. Jeff Denham (Calif.), who over the weekend became the first Republican to sign on to a comprehensive immigration bill similar to the measure that passed the Senate in June. Denham said he hopes other Republicans will announce their support in the coming days, which could give fresh momentum to the legislative push that is central to Obama’s second-term agenda. Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) has yet to bring an immigration bill to the floor, and there is no indication he would do so in the five legislative weeks that remain on the House schedule in 2013. A bipartisan immigration group in the House collapsed in September when two Republicans left, citing a lack of trust in the Obama administration. “We lost some time because of the shutdown,” said Randy Johnson, senior vice president at the Chamber of Commerce, which is participating in Tuesday’s “fly-in” lobbying visit. “There still is time on the House’s schedule to take up some immigration bills,” he said. Yet the administration’s attention — and message — is clearly divided. The White House has been inundated with questions about the buggy HealthCare.gov, the House has begun investigations, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has launched a daily press briefing to update the public on efforts to fix the website. The setback is a familiar one for immigration reform advocates, who have seen the issue be upended by three separate crises in recent months: the debate over military intervention in Syria, the government shutdown and now the implementation of the healthcare law. “It is getting overshadowed,” said Julian Zelizer, a political scientist at Princeton University. “It’s taking up time, and it is consuming the president’s attention,” he said of the healthcare rollout. Obama will travel to Massachusetts on Wednesday to deliver a speech on healthcare. Advocates in and outside of Congress are urging the House to act in some way on immigration before the end of the year, even if it is only on piecemeal legislation that would have to be reconciled with the Senate bill. They have long feared that once the calendar turns to 2014, jump-starting immigration reform will be next to impossible as attention shifts to the midterm election campaigns. “There’s a window here to move some bills before they go out, helping to set the stage for completing the process early next year and getting it done next year,” Johnson told reporters. “I don’t think that it’s the end of the world if they can’t get it all done by early February, but sure, once you start getting into April or May, you start running out of time.” Denham said the imperative was to “get something off the House floor so we can get to conference before the end of the year.” Boehner has ruled out taking up the Senate bill or any comprehensive measure. He has said he is “hopeful” the House can act on immigration, but for months, he has resisted taking a heavy hand in directing a path forward for a conference that remains dominated by conservatives.

#### Boehner Wont Introduce a Bill in the House

By Russell Berman - 10/29/13 06:00 AM ET ObamaCare steals spotlight from push on immigration reformhttp://thehill.com/homenews/administration/331063-obamacare-steals-spotlight-from-push-on-immigration#ixzz2jIkSw3ML

Denham said he hopes other Republicans will announce their support in the coming days, which could give fresh momentum to the legislative push that is central to Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) has yet to bring an immigration bill to the floor, and there is no indication he would do so in the five legislative weeks that remain on the House schedule in 2013. A bipartisan immigration group in the House collapsed in September when two Republicans left, citing a lack of trust in the Obama administration.¶ “We lost some time because of the shutdown,” said Randy Johnson, senior vice president at the Chamber of Commerce, which is participating in Tuesday’s “fly-in” lobbying visit.

### 2ac – pc

#### Political capital doesn’t exist and isn’t key – winners win

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On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”¶ ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ¶ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls.¶ THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER¶ Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.” Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.

#### Obama can’t influence Congress

Koffler 10/11

Keith Koffler, who covered the White House as a reporter for CongressDaily and Roll Call

Obama’s crisis of credibility

By: Keith Koffler

October 11, 2013

http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=CFCD7934-C4A3-4CCC-8261-9038B7E1D759

President Barack Obama is like a novice flier thrust into the cockpit of a 747. He’s pushing buttons, flipping switches and radioing air traffic control, but nothing’s happening. The plane is just slowly descending on its own, and while it may or may not crash, it at least doesn’t appear to be headed to any particularly useful destination.¶ Obama’s ineffectiveness, always a hallmark of his presidency, has reached a new cruising altitude this year. Not even a year into his second term, he looks like a lame duck and quacks like a lame duck. You guessed it — he’s a lame duck.¶ On the world stage, despite Obama’s exertions, Iran’s centrifuges are still spinning, the Israelis and Palestinians remain far apart, Bashar Assad is still in power, the Taliban are gaining strength and Iraq is gripped by renewed violence.¶ At home, none of Obama’s agenda has passed this year. Republicans aren’t bowing to him in the battle of the budget, and much of the GOP seems uninterested in House Speaker John Boehner’s vision of some new grand bargain with the president.Obama has something worse on his hands than being hated. All presidents get hated. But Obama is being ignored. And that’s because he has no credibility. A president enters office having earned a certain stock of political capital just for getting elected. He then spends it down, moving his agenda forward, until he collects a fresh supply by getting reelected. But political capital is only the intangible substrate that gives a president his might. His presidency must also be nourished by credibility — a sense he can be trusted, relied upon and feared — to make things happen. A president enters office with a measure of credibility. After all, he seemed at least trustworthy enough to get elected. But unlike political capital, credibility must be built in office. Otherwise, it is squandered. Obama has used every credibility-busting method available to eviscerate any sense that he can be counted on. He’s dissimulated, proven his unreliability, ruled arbitrarily and turned the White House into a Chicago-style political boiler room. His credibility has been sapped with his political opponents, a public that thinks him incompetent, our allies, who don’t trust him, and, even worse, our enemies, who don’t fear him.

### 2ac – black budget

#### The money for the plan would be taken covertly

Michael E. Salla, PhD Center for Global Peace/School of International Service American University, Washington DC 11/23/2003[ The black budget report, http://www.slideshare.net/ProphecyFactory/the-blackbudgetreport-9017285]

Birth of the Black Budget In 1947, the National Security Act created the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Organization (CIA) and consolidated the US military into one entity, the Department of Defense (DoD). One of the issues that remained unresolved from the creation and operation of the CIA was the extent to which its budget and intelligence activities would remain a secret. According to Article 1, sec. 9, of the US Constitution, “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.” This constitutional requirement conflicted with the need for secrecy concerning Congressional appropriations for the CIA. The solution was for Congress to pass legislation approving the secrecy over the funding mechanisms used for the CIA and its intelligence related activities. The necessary bill was passed with great haste and minimal debate causing considerable concern among those few Congressmen brave enough to openly challenge the constitutionality of the Act. [3] Congressman Emmanuel Celler of New York voted for the bill but protested: “If the members of the Armed Services Committee can hear the detailed information to support this bill, why cannot the entire membership? Are they the Brahmins and we the untouchables? Secrecy is the answer.” [4] Celler, like the majority of Congressmen, passed the CIA Act very much like the wealthy father viewed the birth of an illegitimate child, appropriate care would be taken to provide for the child, but there would be no official admission of patrimony and the responsibility that entails. The 1949 CIA Act comprised additions to those sections of the 1947 National Security Act that dealt with the creation of CIA. The 1949 CIA Act gave a Congressional stamp of approval to the creation of a ‘black budget’ as the following sections make clear: … any other Government agency is authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations [emphasis added]. Sums transferred to the Agency in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under the authority of sections 403a to 403s of this title without regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred. [5] This section meant that funds could be transferred from the appropriations of other government departments earmarked for specific tasks, “without regard to any provisions of law”. For example, a Congressional appropriation earmarked for housing subsidies to low-income workers by Housing and Urban Development (HUD), could be legally transferred either to the CIA for covert intelligence activities or through the CIA to a DoD associated intelligence agency for a classified program. Thus HUD employees might find that their relevant housing programs were lacking the necessary funds for relief efforts even though Congress had appropriated these funds for this purpose. Any HUD official unfortunate enough as to enquire into the location of the missing funds would be deterred from pursuing the issue, and if these officials persisted, they could be summarily dismissed, and then exposed to a variety of CIA activities to silence them. [6] Despite its legal authority to transfer funds from other federal agencies regardless of what their Congressional appropriations were for, the conventional wisdom was that the major source of appropriations for the CIA came through the DoD. This is apparently what President Truman had in mind when he approved that the "operating funds for the organization [CIA] would be obtained from the Departments of State, War, and Navy instead of directly from Congress." [7] This funding arrangement ostensibly assured that the CIA would be subordinate to the Secretaries of Defense and State who would be in a better position to influence its covert activities. Four years after passage of the 1949 CIA Act, the following categories and sums in the relevant defense force appropriations apparently provided the bulk of the black budget funding of the CIA.

### General – XO Solves

#### XO solves

Nakamura 1-6 – David Nakamura and Tara Bahrampour, January 6th, 2013 "Obama using authority for immigrant issues," Washington Post, www.journalgazette.net/article/20130106/NEWS03/301069950/1066/NEWS03

WASHINGTON - The Obama administration’s decision this week to ease visa requirements for hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants represents its latest move to reshape immigration through executive action, even as the White House gears up for an uncertain political fight over a far-more-sweeping legislative package in the months ahead.¶ Immigration advocates on Thursday hailed a rule change at the Department of Homeland Security that would make it easier for many undocumented immigrants to stay in the United States as they seek permanent residency, saying it will improve the lives of relatives who could have been separated for years without the changes.¶ For President Obama – who has called the inability to achieve comprehensive immigration reform among the biggest regrets of his first term – the new policy is among a series of steps his administration has taken over the past year aimed in part at easing the pace of deportations, which have surged during his tenure. The steps also came amid a presidential campaign that included sharp disagreements over immigration policy and strong support among Latinos and Asians for Obama.¶ The centerpiece was Obama’s decision, announced last June, to stop deporting people who were brought to the country as children and have gone on to be productive and otherwise law-abiding residents.¶ “He is checking off every administrative box he can of what he can do with executive authority that comports with his overall view of immigration policy,” said Angela Kelley, an analyst at the Center for American Progress, a liberal think tank allied with the White House.¶ The latest policy change is focused on illegal immigrants who have a spouse, parent or child with U.S. citizenship. Currently, in order to become legal they must leave the United States and apply for a waiver forgiving their unlawful presence in the country. Only then can they apply for an immigrant visa. And if they don’t get a waiver, they are barred from returning to the United States for up to 10 years, depending on the case.¶ The specter of being barred deterred many from applying. But under the rule change finalized Wednesday, those who qualify will be able to apply for waivers from within the United States starting March 4. Applicants must return to their native country for a brief period for the consular immigrant visa process.¶ The new rule greatly reduces the risk inherent in applying for a waiver, as people whose applications are rejected would still be in the United States when they heard the news. Even for those whose applications are approved, the new rule will allow them to spend much less time outside the United States, as they will travel abroad with waivers in hand.

### General – CIR Fails

#### Immigration cant solve the flood of applications

Murthy 9 (Law Firm, “What if CIR Passes? Can USCIS Handle the Increased Workload?”, NewsBrief, 10-30, http://www.murthy.com/news/n\_cirwkl.html)

Any type of legalization program will face significant opposition, particularly during an economic downturn. However, given the numbers of individuals possibly eligible, even under a less expansive program, the USCIS must prepare for a potential onslaught of applications if any type of CIR passes and becomes the law. As many MurthyDotCom and MurthyBulletin readers know from personal experience, the USCIS has historically suffered from backlogs and capacity issues. Were such a measure to pass, absent substantial changes, a flood of new applications could pose a significant challenge to the processing capacity of the USCIS. *USCIS Preparing to Expand Rapidly, Should Need Arise* A Reuters blog quoted USCIS spokesman, Bill Wright, as saying, “The agency has been preparing for the advent of any kind of a comprehensive immigration reform, and if that means a surge of applications and operations, we have been working toward that.” USCIS Director, Alejandro Mayorkas, has stated that the goal of the USCIS is to be ready to expand rapidly to handle the increase in applications that would result from CIR. In the past, opponents have used lack of capacity and preparation as an argument against CIR and expansion of eligibility for immigration benefits. *Will CIR Result in Increased or Reduced Backlogs for Others?* Legal immigrants and their employers have concerns about being disadvantaged by any CIR legislation that would provide benefits to undocumented workers. However, true CIR is not limited to these provisions, and would be expected to contain provisions regarding various aspects of legal immigration. CIR certainly will be hotly debated and any proposed legislation will be modified throughout the debate process. As part of the preparations of the USCIS, and in order not to harm those who have already initiated cases under existing law, the USCIS needs to continue to work on backlogs. While significant progress has been made in many areas, and case processing times have been improved greatly, there are still case backlogs that need to be addressed.

#### Private contractors hired to implement the plan causes fraud

West 7 (Bill, Chief of the National Security Section – Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Immigration “Reform” Will Be National Security Disaster”, 5-17, [http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/ 05/immigration\_reform\_will\_be\_nat.php](http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/%2005/immigration_reform_will_be_nat.php))

CIS has indicated it would need to bring in private contractor personnel to help deal with the monumental workload increase from reform legislation. Such contractors will invariably be quickly hired, poorly trained, probably low-bid, barely vetted and far more subject to bribery and corruption than permanent Government employees. Not that bribery and corruption will necessarily be that necessary. In short order, the system will be overwhelmed. Whatever minimal fraud detection and prevention safeguards might be erected won’t last long in the face of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of applications and petitions to be adjudicated. What that means is the information provided on those applications and petitions, and whatever supporting documents they may have (if any), will essentially be taken at face value. Whatever the applicant alien tells the adjudicator will essentially be taken at face value. There will be little time or process available to verify anything, perhaps beyond running the applicant’s name through a standard battery of computer databases (and, even that may become so time consuming some will slip through the cracks).

### 2ac – defense spending popular

#### Defense spending is popular among Republicans

Kredo 3/21/13 – award-winning political reporter for the Washington Jewish Week, where he frequently broke national news, Kredo’s work has been featured in outlets such as the Jerusalem Post, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, and Politico, among others (Adam, “GOP united on keeping defense spending intact”, Free Beacon, http://freebeacon.com/defending-defense/)

Republican leaders are dismissing charges that the party is fractured on national security issues following the overwhelming passage of a House GOP budget measure that fully restored recently slashed defense spending. The House on Thursday approved by a vote of 228-191 a wide-ranging budget plan authored by Rep. Paul Ryan (R., Wis.). All but 10 Republicans voted in favor of the budget, while every Democrat voted against it. The Ryan plan would allocate about $560.2 billion in defense spending in 2014. That appropriation would all but negate the effects of the recent sequester, which eradicated millions in defense spending and threw the Pentagon into chaos. The allocation would prevent the Pentagon and United States military from being forced to implement a devastating series of cuts that would imperil not only troop readiness but also their benefits. A similar budget proposal authored by the House’s deficit-conscious Republican Study Committee (RSC) also included this level of defense spending, leading Republican leaders to dismiss charges that the party is fundamentally split on such issues. “The overwhelming conservative support for the Ryan budget and the RSC budget are the best indicators of where the Republican Party is on national security that I have seen in a while,” House Armed Services Committee chairman Howard “Buck” McKeon (R., Calif.) told the Free Beacon following the vote. “After the saga of sequestration, we have come together as a party to declare that our military has been cut too much,” McKeon said. “By passing the House budget, we are making a restoration of vital national security resources a top policy priority, every bit as important as balancing the budget.”

### 2ac- drones

#### Mexico can produce drones – open licensing is necessary to overall production

Godoy 5/11/13 – Mexico-based correspondent who covers the environment, human rights and sustainable development, journalist since 1996 and has written for various media outlets in Mexico, Central America and Spain (Emilio, “Mexicans Develop Drones for Peace”, Tierramerica, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/mexicans-develop-drones-for-peace/)

MEXICO CITY, Apr 11 2013 (IPS) - Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), better known as drones, have earned a bad reputation due to their controversial use by the United States in its “war on terrorism”, yet they have almost unlimited potential as tools for scientific research. The word “drone” is most commonly associated with the remotely piloted and heavily armed aircraft that are used by the United States to strike down suspected terrorists, but have also caused a great many civilian deaths in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. However, more than 40 countries around the world either deploy or manufacture drones, according to reports consulted for an article published by IPS. These unmanned airplanes and helicopters are used for such diverse purposes as drawing maps, exploring the ocean floor, measuring temperature or pollution levels, monitoring weather phenomena, and the surveillance of high-risk areas or archaeological sites. Last month, the U.S. space agency NASA sent drones into the plume of the Turrialba volcano in Costa Rica to study its chemical composition. “The technology is emerging, the first applications have just barely begun. Society itself has learned to accept drones beyond their military uses, because they have seen the different ways they can be used. It’s just a matter of time” until they become more widely developed and used, said young Mexican entrepreneur Jordi Muñoz, co-founder of 3D Robotics, a pioneer in the manufacture of drones in Mexico. His story mirrors the evolution of drones, which he began to build in 2007 with the help of 500 dollars provided by U.S. physicist Chris Anderson. “He gave me the money purely on trust. It was the best 500 dollars I ever invested. I decided to build a drone. I was developing the automatic pilot and I went on Google to look for information when I came across a forum. I went in, registered, and saw that they were posting things about homemade drones,” recalled Muñoz, who is currently finishing a degree in computer engineering at the University of California, Berkeley in the United States. The forum was DIY (“Do It Yourself”) Drones, an online community created by Anderson in 2007 as a space for hobbyists who build their own UAVs to share experiences, electronic codes and component maps. “I started to post videos, write code, and document and publish what I was doing,” Muñoz told Tierramérica\*. His work caught the attention of Anderson, the editor-in-chief of Wired magazine until this past January and now the young Mexican’s partner in 3D Robotics. The company does not sell UAVs for military use. The vehicles are designed in the southwest U.S. city of San Diego and assembled across the border in Tijuana, Mexico. They receive between 100 and 150 orders daily from clients in the United States, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Israel and Japan. 3D Robotics currently employs 60 people and hopes to expand its staff to 100 by the end of the year. Since its founding in 2009, the company has earned around 10 million dollars through sales and received another five million from three U.S. funds that provide financing for tech firms. “In 2013 we want to professionalise all of our products. There have been huge advances, everything has now been greatly simplified, and we want to make drones easy to use. But we need engineers to write code, for manufacturing,” said Muñoz. Working on the basis of open licensing, a network of engineers around the world work together to improve codes and develop more advanced products.

#### Drones Are Key to Decapitating AQAP – Criticisms That Highlight Blowback Wrongly Link Drone Strikes to Recruitment and Overstate the Negative Consequences – Only Increasing the Effectiveness of Drone Strikes Can Drain AQAPs Legitimacy and Create Space for Alternative Engagement Strategies

By Stacey Emker second year Master’s candidate at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations January 14, 2013 Analyzing the US Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2013/01/analyzing-the-us-counterterrorism-strategy-in-yemen/

When direct action is taken, drone strikes are conducted in concert with the Yemeni government to avoid civilian casualty. President Hadi publicly endorsed U.S. drone strikes in September 2012, making Yemen a reliable counterterrorism partner. This factor is crucial when assessing the effectiveness of drones in Yemen under former President Saleh compared to President Hadi. While former President Saleh pledged Yemen’s support to the U.S. in the “war on terror,” U.S. officials and Yemeni experts questioned Saleh’s commitment and saw him as an unreliable partner and source of intelligence. John Brennan, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, has made frequent public visits to Yemen over the past year. When speaking of President Hadi’s counterterrorism efforts, Brennan has stated that “the cooperation has been more consistent, more reliable and with a more committed and determined focus.” With this, the information provided by the Yemeni government under President Hadi has greatly improved the efficacy of the drone campaign, and helped in avoiding catastrophic mistakes.¶ The conventional understanding of drones and collateral damage is not a sufficient or systematic explanation of recruitment within the domestic context of Yemen. Christopher Swifts’ interviews with tribal leaders, Islamic Politicians, Salafist clerics, and other sources all revealed that AQAP recruitment is not motivated solely by U.S. drone strikes, but driven by economic desperation. AQAP insurgents lure young Yemeni men with the promise of a rifle, a car, and a salary of four-hundred dollars a month, which is a fortune when half the population is living on less than two dollars a day. AQAP has employed a soft power approach by fulfilling social needs in order to build networks of mutual dependency.¶ Despite the general antipathy for drone strikes, a majority of the Yemeni’s interviewed expressed that AQAP posed a serious threat to their country and had a pragmatic view of the U.S. drone campaign. As long as drones target legitimate terrorists, Yemenis grudgingly acknowledge their utility. With this, it is important to note Yemen’s religious majority and nationalism. The population of Yemen is almost entirely Muslim, made up of Zaydis and Shaf’is. Zaydis are found mostly in North and Northwest Yemen and belong to a branch of Shi’a Islam. Zaydis form the the Huthi insurgent movement, and AQAP statements in Inspire have connected the movement to threats posed by Shi’a in eastern Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. Since AQAP has attacked two Huthi processions in 2010 and threatened supporters, Zaydi Yemenis do not represent practical recruitment options for AQAP. On the hand, the majority of Yemenis are Shafi’is making up the South and East. The Shafi’is school follows one of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence and is considered a relatively moderate form of Islam. While Islamic radicalism is prevalent within the country, Shafi’is is culturally very different and is not exactly fertile breeding grounds for extremist ideology. As a result, the Al-Qaeda ideology does not go hand-in-hand with the majority of the Yemeni people.¶ Analysis of AQAP’s history suggests that the group’s resiliency within Yemen is due to a group of local Yemeni leaders who understand the local language, tribal customs, and developed relationships with prominent sheiks. Unlike predecessor jihadist groups in Yemen, AQAP has exercised strategic discipline in creating coherent, but nuanced propaganda. The group assimilates broadly popular grievances into a single narrative proposing international jihad as the only solution. The group exploits common malcontent with the Yemeni government over injustices including corruption, the absence of public services and political reform, and unequal distribution of profits from oil. In addition, AQAP has not explicitly called for the outright dissolution of tribal identity like AQAM in Afghanistan Somalia, Iraq, and Pakistan. Within Yemen, AQAP targets Western interests, Yemeni security officials, and economic sectors such as oil and tourism. The group has specifically avoided Yemeni civilian casualties in bombings and suicide attacks. Also, AQAP has avoided potentially divisive American and European targets, such as the many Western-language students, foreign aid, and medical workers who remained in Yemen until 2010. With this, AQAP leaders recognized the importance of managing perceptions in order to sustain legitimacy and have even denied responsibility for terrorist attacks that did not fit with its narrative. The most direct way to reduce AQAP’s viability in Yemen, while simultaneously limiting its capacity to attack the US, requires the removal of its local leadership through drone strikes who are responsible for the group’s strategic guidance.¶ With this, it important to note that drone strikes represent only one tool in the U.S.’s comprehensive policy towards Yemen. The costs of U.S. drone strikes correspond with three distinct forms of blowback that have helped to strengthen AQAP’s narrative and increased recruitment and sympathy for Al-Qaeda linked militants. However, the costs do not outweigh the utility of drone strikes against AQAP within the domestic context. While the U.S. acted more unilaterally in Yemen under President Saleh, the Obama Administration is now working in concert with the transitional government of President Hadi. With this, the relationship between the U.S. and Yemen has transformed into a working partnership in the fight against AQAP. As a partnership, this counterterrorism policy is beneficial for both Yemeni and international support.¶ While Yemen is facing a number of issues, debilitating AQAP represents the first step in improving the overall security situation. By targeting AQAP’s local leadership, the U.S. can eliminate the individuals who are most responsible for maintaining the group’s coherency and strategic guidance. Furthermore, it can be presumed that the AQAP members next in line will be less skilled and will be more prone to violence in order to consolidate power. The leadership will make more mistakes, such as targeting Yemeni civilians, and undermine the group’s legitimacy within Yemen.

#### Nuke Terror Outweighs All Other Impacts – Most Likely Scenario For Extinction

-this evidence cites multiple peer-reviewed studies as well as terrorist group statements

-answers defense based on means – there’s lots of unsafe material around the world and a lot of providers

-answers defense based on motives – terrorists have an incentive to spur retaliation because it create chaos

Jaspal– Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan 12 (Zafar Nawaz, “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?”, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 1, 2012, 91:111)

The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are perilous for the national security of a state. Indeed, in an age of transnational terrorism and unprecedented dissemination of dualuse nuclear technology, ignoring nuclear terrorism threat is an imprudent policy choice. The incapability of terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material does noteliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the same time, the absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/ radiological terrorism does not qualify the assertion that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be remained a myth. Farsighted rationality obligates that one should not miscalculate transnational terrorist groups — whose behavior suggests that they have a death wish — of acquiring nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be sensible about the published information that huge amount of nuclear material is spread around the globe. According to estimate it is enough to build more than 120,000 Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1). The alarming fact is that a few storage sites of nuclear/radiological materials are inadequately secured and continue to be accumulated in unstable regions (Sambaiew, 2010, February). Attempts at stealing fissile material had already been discovered (Din & Zhiwei, 2003: 18). Numerous evidences confirm that terrorist groups had aspired to acquire fissile material for their terrorist acts. Late Osama bin Laden, the founder of al Qaeda stated that acquiring nuclear weapons was a“religious duty” (Yusufzai, 1999, January 11). The IAEA also reported that “al-Qaeda was actively seeking an atomic bomb.” Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a dissenter of Al Qaeda, in his trial testimony had “revealed his extensive but unsuccessful efforts to acquire enriched uranium for al-Qaeda” (Allison, 2010, January: 11). On November 9, 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed that “we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use them (Mir, 2001, November 10).” On May 28, 2010, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist confessed that he met Osama bin Laden. He claimed that “I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11 not to give him nuclear know-how, but to seek funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul (Syed, 2010, May 29).” He was arrested in 2003 and after extensive interrogation by American and Pakistani intelligence agencies he was released (Syed, 2010, May 29). Agreed, Mr. Mahmood did not share nuclear know-how with Al Qaeda, but his meeting with Osama establishes the fact that the terrorist organization was in contact with nuclear scientists. Second, the terrorist group has sympathizers in the nuclear scientific bureaucracies. It also authenticates bin Laden’s Deputy Ayman Zawahiri’s claim which he made in December 2001: “If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available (Allison, 2010, January: 2).” The covert meetings between nuclear scientists and al Qaeda members could not be interpreted as idle threats and thereby the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism is real. The 33Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted in 2008 that “what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear (Mueller, 2011, August 2).” Indeed, the nuclear deterrence strategy cannot deter the transnational terrorist syndicate from nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks. Daniel Whiteneck pointed out: “Evidence suggests, for example, that al Qaeda might not only use WMD simply to demonstrate the magnitude of its capability but that it might actually welcome the escalation of a strong U.S. response, especially if it included catalytic effects on governments and societies in the Muslim world. An adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the consequences cannot be deterred” (Whiteneck, 2005, Summer: 187) Since taking office, President Obama has been reiterating that “nuclear weapons represent the ‘gravest threat’ to United States and international security.” While realizing that the US could not prevent nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks singlehandedly, he launched 47an international campaign to convince the international community about the increasing threat of nuclear/ radiological terrorism. He stated on April 5, 2009: “Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5).” He added: “One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe” (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5). In July 2009, at the G-8 Summit, President Obama announced the convening of a Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 to deliberate on the mechanism to “secure nuclear materials, combat nuclear smuggling, and prevent nuclear terrorism” (Luongo, 2009, November 10). President Obama’s nuclear/radiological threat perceptions were also accentuated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887 (2009). The UNSC expressed its grave concern regarding ‘the threat of nuclear terrorism.” It also recognized the need for all States “to take effective measures to prevent nuclear material or technical assistance becoming available to terrorists.” The UNSC Resolution called “for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” (UNSC Resolution, 2009) The United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) document revealed on April 6, 2010 declared that “terrorism and proliferation are far greater threats to the United States and international stability.” (Security of Defence, 2010, April 6: i). The United States declared that it reserved the right to“hold fully accountable” any state or group “that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts (Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010, April: 12)”. This declaration underscores the possibility that terrorist groups could acquire fissile material from the rogue states**.**

### Impact Defense

#### Global food prices down – demand and supplies

**Reuters, 13** (3/27/13, "Global food prices fall on lower demand, improved supplies -World Bank", http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/global-food-prices-fall-on-lower-demand-improved-supplies-world-bank)

WASHINGTON, March 27 (Reuters) - Global food prices have declined in recent months as lower demand for cereals and improved supplies pushed prices down, the World Bank said on Wednesday, warning that prices were still near record peaks and volatile.¶ The World Bank's Food Price Index showed international prices of wheat fell by 11 percent, sugar by 10 percent and maize, or corn, by 6 percent during the four-month period between October 2012 and February 2013.

## Brazil SOI DA

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#### No impact to free trade

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So, how does one explain that through the interdependence argument? The realist correlation seems to be right but, as David Copeland argues in his International Security article (Vol 20, no 4; Spring 1996), “trade levels had been high for the previous 30 years [in the run-up to WWI]; hence, even if interdependence was a necessary condition for the war, it was not sufficient.” Copeland offers a different approach and calls it a theory of trade expectations: “Trade expectations theory introduces a new causal variable, the expectations of future trade, examining its impact on the overall expected value of the trading option if a state decides to forgo war. This supplements the static consideration in liberalism and realism of the levels of interdependence at any point in time, with the importance of leaders’ dynamic expectations into the future. “Levels of interdependence and expectations of future trade, considered simultaneously, lead to new predictions. Interdependence can foster peace, as liberals argue, but this will only be so when states expect that trade levels will be high into the foreseeable future. If highly interdependent states expect that trade will be severely restricted — that is, if their expectations for future trade are low — realists are likely to be right: the most highly dependent states will be the ones most likely to initiate war, for fear of losing the economic wealth that supports their long-term security. In short, high interdependence can be either peace-inducing or war-inducing, depending on the expectations of future trade.” The good news, however, is that trade is inevitable. To put it simply, until there is a seller and a buyer, trade will happen. There is empirical data to support this, compiled by Katherine Barbieri. Barbieri also co-authored with Jack Levy an article in the Journal of Peace Research (Vol 36, no 4, 1999), captioned, “Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade”. Barbieri and Levy maintain that “there are numerous historical cases of trading with the enemy during wartime, including trade in strategic goods that directly affect the ability of a state to prosecute the war.” Trade will continue even when states are at war. While dyadic trade will be negatively impacted, trade through third parties and circuitously will continue. This is not to say that states must fight or that trade through third parties in such circumstances is preferable to dyadic trade. The point is that empirical data does not support the central tenet of the liberal theory that trade promotes peace or the realist assumption that states, because of vulnerability, will snap those ties. If there’s a demand for item X made by state Y in state Z, X will get to Z, regardless of the conditions of war and peace. This is also borne out by informal trade linkages between Pakistan and India, especially trade through third parties.

#### Brazil and Mexico will cooperate- not zero sum

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The future of Latin America will not be characterized by a contest between Mexico and Brazil to gain the role of the leader since the core of brighter future lies in their cooperation. Another reason is the existence of centers with different power and ambitions –mainly Mexico and Brazil, the third and slightly less important one being Venezuela. None of them has the capacity for an overall leadership in the Latin American region. **Mexico has lost the prospect to become the uncontested leader of the region**, but has an option to play a role of a partner and to understand the interests of his own community vis -à -vis the US that would lead up to the role of facilitator in their mutual interaction. On the other hand, Brazil as an uncontested leader of South America will face fewer obstacles to achieve its vision of South America. Problem appears when taking into account that Brazil’s activities are almost exclusively concentrated in South America which can be seen as an impediment to achieve the desired position of the leader of the entire region. Thus, both Mexico and Brazil should opt for mutual co - operation and inter action in their foreign policies which is the basic prerequisite to get Latin America on the right way once and for all.

**U.S. will bail out Brazil if they can’t administer trade**

**Hirst 04** (Monica, Executive Director – FunCEB, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations, p. 95)

But, in a world where policy makers do not inhabit a Benthamite universal republic of exchange but are naturally driven by mercantilist logics and domestic protectionist pressures, it is also this asymmetry that underpins much of the economic friction that has been such a consistent feature of the relationship since the early 1970s. Thus, we have seen repeated Brazilian complaints against the high levels of U.S. protectionism against Brazilian products in such areas as steel, ethanol, shoes, textiles, orange juice, and meat, and the number of antidumping and countervailing duty actions against Brazil. For the United States, what happens in Brazil has the capacity to affect both U.S. interests and the quality and character of life in the United States. But economic interdependence is neither strongly structural nor consistently politically salient as liberal interdependence writing might suggest. Take, for example, the impact of economic and financial developments in Brazil on the stability of the U.S. and global financial systems. When in 1998-99 there was very real fear of financial contagion across emerging markets, the United States became **closely involved** in the Brazilian crisis. However, as the crisis passed for the financial system and, more important, for the interests of U.S. banks, the issue slipped off the United States’s agenda. The United States is therefore less constrained than in the case of Mexico from using the power that derives form this asymmetrical interdependence to press its economic interests in Brazil.

#### Brazil free trade fails- GDP increases are tied to individual BRIC economies, not the whole organization

Nye 13- former US assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, is University Professor at Harvard University. He is the author of The Future of Power and the forthcoming Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era, (Joseph S., “BRICS Without Mortar”, April 3rd, 2013, Project Syndicate, <http://www.trilateral.org/download/file/Nye_BRICS_without_Mortar_April_2013.pdf>, //CJD)

Indeed, while the BRICS may be helpful in coordinating certain diplomatic tactics, the term lumps together highly disparate countries. Not only is South Africa miniscule compared to the others, but China’s economy is larger than those of all of the other members combined. Likewise, India, Brazil, and South Africa are democracies, and occasionally meet in an alternative forum that they call “IBSA.” And, while the large autocracies, Russia and China, find it diplomatically advantageous to tweak the Americans, both have different but crucial relationships with the United States. And both have worked to thwart efforts by India, Brazil, and South Africa to become permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. As I wrote three years ago, in analytical terms, it makes little sense to include Russia, a former superpower, with the developing economies. Russia lacks diversified exports, faces severe demographic and health problems, and, in former President Dmitri Medvedev’s words, “greatly needs modernization.” Little has changed since Putin returned to the presidency last year. While economic growth benefited from the dramatic growth in oil and gas prices during the last decade, other competitive industries have yet to emerge, and the country now faces the prospect of declining energy prices. While it aims to maintain 5% annual growth, its economy was relatively flat last year. If Russia’s power resources seem to be declining, Brazil’s appear to be more impressive, given it has a territory nearly three times the size of India’s, a 90% literacy rate, and triple the per capita income of India (and nearly twice that of China). But, in the three years since my earlier assessment, Brazil’s performance has slipped: annual economic growth has slowed from 7.5% in 2010 to 1% last year, with a 3.5% rate expected in 2013. Like Brazil, India experienced a spurt of output growth after liberalizing its economy in the 1990’s; indeed, until a few years ago, GDP growth was approaching Chinese-style rates. This year, however, output is expected to rise by a relatively sluggish 5.9%. Unless it improves its infrastructure and literacy rate (particularly for women), India is unlikely to catch up with China. So, should we take today’s BRICS more seriously than the BRICs of three years ago? Tellingly, the meeting in Durban failed to produce any details of the structure of the proposed new development bank, suggesting that little progress had been made in the year since the BRICS’ last meeting in New Delhi, where the plan was announced. In fact, despite a commitment to launch “formal negotiations” to establish the bank, disagreements about the size and shares of the bank’s capital have not been resolved. That lack of unity is symptomatic of the BRICS members’ underlying incompatibilities. In political terms, China, India, and Russia are vying with each other for power in Asia. And, in economic terms, Brazil, India, and South Africa are concerned about the effects of China’s undervalued currency on their economies. Three years ago, I wrote that, “BRIC is not likely to become a serious political organization of like-minded states.” The BRICS’ most recent meeting has given me no reason to revise that assessment.

#### EU instability makes BRIC collapse inevitable

Ogier 11- staff writer at Emerging Markets, (Thierry, “Brics fail to agree on rescue plan”, 09/22/2011, Emerging Markets, <http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/2905738/Brics-fail-to-agree-on-rescue-plan.html>, //CJD)

Finance ministers from the Brics nations warned of mounting contagion risks at a meeting in Washington yesterday, but failed to advance any concrete measures that could help to resolve the crisis. “The crisis is worsening. We have to prevent it from getting to another dimension,” Guido Mantega, Brazil’s finance minister, said “Until now the crisis was only in the advanced countries, [...] but there is now a risk that the sovereign debt crisis of various countries may develop into a new financial crisis. There is a risk of a crisis of large proportions.” But although the Brics grouping – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, which joined the group last year – indicated a willingness to assist in measures aimed at restoring confidence to battered markets and preventing a renewed global downturn, yesterday’s meeting of finance ministers from the five nations failed to arrive at specific recommendations. Earlier, South African finance minister Pravin Gordhan described proposals to buy European bonds to limit the scope of a crisis as “an idea that my Brazilian colleagues have raised”. “Those of us that have the ability to contribute to that should perhaps consider that,” he told Emerging Markets. “Buying European bonds is just one idea.” The most important thing is to “re-establish the level of co-operation and give and take” that emerged after 2008. Gordhan also came out strongly in favour of the financial transaction tax proposed by France at the G20. “In principle we have to start looking at alternate sources of financing. “There are still some debates about where the tax is generated, whom does the tax go to, does it operate on a country basis, does it operate on a global basis?” he said. But India has expressed reservations. Duvvuri Subbarao, governor of the Reserve Bank of India, said that the country is “able to absorb the [capital] flows that are coming in” and was taking no measures to control them. “We are quite unlike other economies which have a problem of excess of capital flows.” Subbarao added that Brics policymakers had to balance the merits of assisting in the recovery of Europe and advanced nations with domestic development needs. “There is (an) enormous amount of demand for resources at home for poverty reduction, so there is going to be a big, big tension between giving money to a multilateral institution for the purpose of restoring global stability and meeting our own aspirations at home,” he said. Gordhan said a new cohesiveness was needed to meet international challenges. “We look forward to returning to the good old days of the G20 in 2008 when there was urgency, there was passion, there was coherence and a lot of cohesion which enabled us to avert the great depression. Now we require the great recovery. How we get there is part of the challenge,” he said.

#### BRICs party is over – the plan is the best international model – our evidence is comparative

Åslund, 13 – Senior fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University(Anders, 9-4 “The BRICs party is over” http://www.voxeu.org/article/brics-party-over)djm

Reinforced belief in state capitalism Worse, the current BRIC thinking goes in the wrong direction. All have large state sectors and are relatively protectionist. Because of their recent economic successes and the West’s financial crisis, their policymakers increasingly see state capitalism as the solution, and private enterprise and free markets as problems. In Russia and Brazil especially, influential circles call for a greater role of the state, although the corrupt state is their key problem. Last month Igor Rudensky, the United Russia parliamentarian who chairs the State Duma’s committee on economic policy, even stated that “[t]he leading role and the commanding heights in the economy should belong to state corporations… We have to preserve all the positive from [the Soviet] historical experience”. Back to the future! Even if the BRIC political leaders were to face up to reality, their giant state corporations rule the roost. They hold an iron grip over energy, transport and banking. Regardless of official government policies they can extract cheap financing from the government and monopoly rents from the weaker private actors in the economy.2 But Brazil, Russia, India and China do not rule the world. Because of them the West has played down the role of the WTO instead seeking regional trade agreements among like-minded countries such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the US and Europe and the Trans-Pacific Partnership with most states (but China) around the Pacific Rim. The BRICs’ party is over. Their ability to get going again rests on their ability to carry through reforms in grim times for which they lacked the courage in a boom.